seen that it was impossible to withdraw them. Three division of this army, and they of the best, are now scattered over the country, and I see no prospect of recovering them. The troops want some rest, some time for reorganization and recruiting their ranks. The enemy is making great efforts to reorganize their army in my immediate front. Large bounties are given to those who re-enlist. Many are re-enlisting by means of their people at home, so as to prevent the draft. Conscripts to their ranks are also daily arriving. According to our scouts on the Potomac, over 2,000 have come up to Alexandria since the beginning of this year. I see nothing doing on our part, and I fear the spring will open upon us and find us without an army.

R. E. LEE,

General.

[Fifth indorsement.]

JANUARY 15, 1864.

Respectfully submitted to Secretary of War, whose attention is specially invited to the within remarks of General Lee.

S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA,
August 31, 1863.

Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War, Richmond:

SIR: Supposes the map of North Carolina before you and allow me to illustrate briefly only a single phase in the condition of Wilmington and its probable attack or defense. Suppose me without an army, or at most with but a single brigade, a force much large than I really have at my command. The enemy, after due preparation, of which we may or may not have received notice, lands a strong force at Shallotte, 18 miles from Fort Caswell and 36 miles from Wilmington, a point much more suitable for his operations and more convenient than Light-House Inlet at Charleston. Once landed, as I have not the force at hand to fight at once, three courses are open to him, either of which will be demonstrably fatal. He can advance on Fort Caswell, as he is doing on Sumter, slowly but securely, strengthening his position and the tenacity of his grip on the land, or, which a bolder fee would do at once, march upon Smithville, take its batteries in reverse, cut off Fort Caswell and shortly destroy it, or march directly upon the city and in its front, secure from attack by the obstacles of Brunswick River and the Cape Fear, plant his long-range guns, and at the easy distance of 2 miles destroy the city, close up the river, and turn all the formidable batteries against naval attack, on which so much labor has been expended.

All this is not only possible but highly probable. There are, besides, other lines of attack, equally feasible. I use the description of this in particular only to illustrate what I wish to impress, that the whole system of the plan of the defense adopted here (the only plan, indeed, which can be successful) depends on the presence, I might almost say the constant presence, of an army. On that, and that