alone, depends the safety of the flank; and not only that, but on the rapidity and success of the attack of that army rest safety of Caswell and Fisher, of this the last harbor left to us, and the city, an important point, however considered.

To have this army assemble, but assemble too late, would, it seems to me, only increase the disaster. I hope that nothing here will be left to chance. The assembling a force, and such a force as would undoubtedly be required, will take, in the present condition of our transportation and resources, a long time-time that we cannot afford to lose. While the railroads are constantly deteriorating they are liable to be cut off daily. I have intimated that a large force is required here.

Let me illustrate by again referring to the map, and suppose the enemy attempting the southerly line of attack, with but a small force at my command. I throw my troops to the west of the Cape Fear River, and the fate of Fort Fisher and the harbor is sealed. I know no place now in the Confederacy where the presence of a large body of veteran troops is more necessary or more important than this. It is necessary now to prevent possible and by no means importable disaster, and to be ready. In the event of attack their presence will be indispensable. I beg that you will not consider me importance in this matter. It oppresses me. If is not at all for me to make a comparison with the importance of this as compared with any other part or movement of the war; it is only for me to call attention to the case, and to point out the necessities and indicate the means of defense. I hope you will please to lay the subject before the President for his consideration.

When Vicksburg was threatened, if I am correctly informed, 20,000 troops were not thought insufficient. At that time Vicksburg was a point first in importance. It has fallen. I think now this place is quite as important as Vicksburg was then. When it is attacked, in the changed circumstances which now may be observed, the fewer objects of attack for the enemy, the greater power of concentrating his forces on a single point and the increased need on our part to hold this with certainly. I must say that less than 20,000 men will hardly succeed.

Very respectfully,

W. H. C. WHITING,

Major-General.

RICHMOND, VA., January 8, 1864.

Major General G. E. PICKETT,

Petersburg, Va.:

Your letter of 6th instant received. Order Clingman's brigade to be within reach of General Whiting, and to be subject to his orders when needed. It will be replaced at Petersburg by Kemper's brigade from Hanover Junction. Your and General Whiting must be co-operate and keep up intercommunication for that purposes. You will communicate this dispatch to General Whiting.

S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General.