would suggest, instead of keeping any force at the Warm Springs, you would place it at Morris Hill, and picket at Callaghan's. I presume that you are in communication with Colonel jackson, and he may able to give you information of the enemy's movements I expect to ascertain the enemy's movements in the course of the morning. If he attempts to avoid Echols here, and escape by Callaghan's, we can reach Callaghan's before he can. Echols will hold this place here until he ascertains the enemy's movements. It is possible that they will attempt to pass Echols' right by Gap Mills, by passing one of the many gorges in these mountains to the south of this position between Echols and McCausland, who is at Newport, in Giles County. If he does that, he will pass out by the western portion of Monroe and Greenbrier; if he does so, you cannot touch him.

Under all the circumstances of the case, as I see them now, I think that you should have a force at Morris Hill and a strong picket at Callaghan's. The enemy were certainly at New Castle at sundown yesterday. They cannot pass Echols here. They may escape by Clifton Forge or by Covington, if you do not prevent them. Echols will give you all the aid that he can. We are closer to the enemy than you are, and will be more likely to know their movements. I will endeavor to keep you informed. A portion of our small mounted force has been directed, if the enemy attempts to pass from New Castle direct to Covington direct to Covington or by Clifton Forge, to fall back in front of them, so as to give to Colonel Jackson and you are earliest information.

SAM. JONES,

Major-General.

The operator at Jackson's River will use every effort to get the above to General Early and a copy to Colonel Jackson. Colonel Jackson must have a copy of it.

SAM. JONES,

Major-General.

I relieved somewhat upon the demonstration which was to be made against Staunton on the next day. I also thought that General Scammon might divert the force under Echols from interfering with mine. In both these trusts I was at fault. From all the information I have been able to collect, I believe the Kanawha force retired from Lewisburg on the 13th, without waiting until the 18th, as prearranged, and without making an effort in the direction of Union. The detachment sent from the command of General Sullivan was too feeble to make the threat upon Staunton of sufficient avail to keep Early from besetting my command upon its return. Instead of approaching Staunton on the 20th and 21st, it was retiring through New Market on the 20th.

The dispositions of the rebels had been prompt and skillful; Rosser's brigade had crossed the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, on the 14th, made some demonstrations upon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad near Bull Run; thence passed the Blue Ridge through Ashby's Gap; were stopped by the high water in the Shenandoah, and moved up by Front Royal to cut off the detachment from Harper's Ferry. The division of Early left Hanover Junction on the 15th; arrived at Staunton the same night; marched to Buffalo Gap the ensuing day, and thence to the Warm Sprigs and Millborough. Fitzhugh Lee's division, leaving Charlottesville on the 14th, came into the valley, where it was deceived to Thoburn's presence, and diverted by the detachment from Sullivan's command, for a day or two, when it set out for Buchanan.

At Jackson's River, though trusting in the co-operation of the Kanawha and Shenandoah forces, I acted as through they would be of no assistance to me, which was indeed the case. My column, nearly 4 miles long, was hastened across the first bridge. When all had passed but my ambulances, a few wagons, and a regiment in the rear, an attack was made by Jackson's force.

The company on the Clifton Forge road was driven away; three ambulances were captured, and an effort was made to take the bridge,