which was unsuccessful. A night attack in always appalling, even to experienced troops. Unavailing efforts were made to open communication with the regiment cut off until morning, when it appeared that the enemy was determined to maintain his position upon the high cliffs which overlooked the bridge.

During the night the balance of my command had been concentrated at Callaghan's, and an efficient defense established upon all the roads approaching that point. Finding it impossible to dislodge the enemy as long as the bridges remained, I directed them to be destroyed. The enemy at once left the cliffs and endeavored to reach the flank and rear of the regiment which remained on that side.

Orders were sent to the regiment to swim the river or come to me over the mountain, around the bend; and, after destroying the train, it swam the river, with the loss of 4 men drowned. When nearly across,a formal demand from General Early was received by the officer commanding the rear guard to surrender, addressed to the commanding officer of the United States forces. As my column was then in motion over the Alleghanies, no formal reply was returned to the demand.

During the night attack, 5 officers and 119 men were lost by being captured. It was thought that had the regiment in rear been advanced steadily forward, these captures might have been mostly prevented, and we should not have been obliged to destroy our wagons and ambulances the following day.

The road over the Alleghanies led us to Antony's Creek, between the White Sulphur Springs and Huntersville.

A force of the enemy was reported at Gatewood's, which is 12 miles east of Huntersville. My command was yet 30 miles from that point. If I could cross the Greenbrier and reach Marling's Bottom before the enemy, my command would be safe. By a very obscure road the Greenbrier was reached and crossed on the 21st opposite Hillsborough, and we encamped for the night at the northern base of Droop Mountain. My scouts thrown out kept me informed of the enemy's movements and positions. For thirty hours after my column left Callaghan's, the enemy made great efforts to intercept my force, but they generally took wrong roads. The citizens who knew the country best regarded our capture as unavoidable. It was expected, as may be seen from the orders given Colonel Moor by me, that he would remain near Droop Mountain until the 18th, but owing to orders he received from the general commanding the department, subsequent to the reception of mine, he also retired on the 14th, thus leaving no co-operative forces, except Colonel Thoburn's, in the positions I had reason to expect them to be on the 20th and 21st. Unaided, with a weary command of 2,500 men, I had marched through a difficult country, in which not less than 12,000 rebels were maneuvered to effort my capture.

On the way to Edray my rear guard experienced some trifling attacks on the 22d. The road thence to Beverly was a glacier, which was traversed with great difficulty and peril. The artillery was drawn almost entirely by dismounted men during the 23rd and 24th. Couriers had been sent forward to Beverly to bring out subsistence and forage, which were succeeded, after extreme hardships, in meeting on the 24th.

The officers and men undertook all that was required of them, and endured all the sufferings from fatigue, hunger, and cold with extraordinary fortitude, even with cheerfulness. The march of 400