Britain the ministry are the executive government. The Sovereign rules but does not govern. In the Confederacy the heads of departments neither rule nor govern. In Great Britain the Sovereign is irresponsible and "can do no wrong," and the ministry alone are responsible. In the Confederacy the President may do wrong and is responsible for so doing. The remedy for his wrong-doing is impeachment by the House of Representatives. The Senate is without power even to impeach and can only act as judges when the House impeaches.

In Great Britain, the crown being heredinary as well as irresponsible, the control of the people over the policy of the Government consists in refusing by theiir Commons, the grant to the Sovereign of supplies necessary for carrying on the Government. In the Confederacy the people choose the President as well as the Congress and by giving him a term of six years and making the tenure of office of the Cabinet "his pleasure" have debarred themselves from the power of enforcing any change of administrative policy during that time. It is known that this lengthened term of siix years without re-eligibility was conferred by our Constitution on the Executive for the express purpose of imparting stability to the Government and of withdrawing all motive for courting popular favor at the expense of duty.

In Great Britain the ministry are members of the legislative department, originate laws, guide administration, exercise the appointing power to all offices (the sovereign power being in practice purely nominal), are apprised in advance of the grounds of a proposed vote of want of confidence, and have the power and means of defending themselves. In the Confederacy the exact reverse of all this is the case, and the heads of departments are not even admitted to the right of debate on subjects appertaining to their departments as contemplated by the Constitution.

In Great Britain, even after a vote of censure, the ministry may dissolve Parliament and appeal to the country, which has not unfrequently reversed the vote. The Commons are thus restrained form factions or unfounded charges by the responsibility of making them at the peril of beiing discountenanced by the people, and thus losing their own seats. In the Confederacy the exact reverse of all this is again the case, and a vote of want of confidence would be free from alal salutary restraint or responsibility.

It is needless to continue this exposition. It is too clear for doubt that the legislative and executive departments deriving equally their existence from the votes of the people, it would be quite as proper for the executive department to express want of confidence in the legislative department as for the latter to express distrust in the former.

In stating these views nothing is further from my intention than to deny to enlightened public opinion, where deliberately formed after knowledge of facts, its just and legitimate influence.

Such public opinion is almost invariably correct, and can rarely be disregarded without injury to the public weal. My purpose is simply to deny that the declaration of a State delegation, f one or both Houses, is entitled to be considered as the authentic expression of such opinion or as requiring concession from a co-ordinate department of the Government.

I have been led into this digression by the peculiar circumstances which have given rise to your resignation. They are without precedent. I cannot, however, refuse to relieve you from duties which the action of your State delegation has rendered distasteful to you. That