with the Fifth Corps. Small guards were left with the trains, and all the battalions were at Old Wilderness Tavern about daylight on the morning of the 6th, except Captain Van Brocklin and his company, who did not get notice until late in the day. There I reported to General Warren, and afterward to General Griffin, who assigned the command a position in the rifle-pits. Ammunition was distributed as speedily as possible, and we marched into the rifle-pits with ten companies, in all 32 officers and 1,010 enlisted men. Most of our officers and men were at work during the afternoon in building new lines of rifle-pits and strengthening the old ones. Just before dark, as the men were returning to their rifle-pits whit their tools from a new line on which they had been at work, the enemy succeeded in flanking and breaking a division of the Sixth Corps on our front and right and drove them behind the second line. At this time we occupied the line on the left of the Orange Court-House turnpike, but when the front line was broken, I was ordered by General Griffin to move my command as quick las possible and occupy the line on the right of the turnpike. On account of the roughness of the ground to march over on double quick, and also on account of stragglers being halted and placed in the line whit our troops, some confusion occurred in getting to our new position, but this was rectified in a few minutes, and awaited the expected attack. The enemy did not, however, succeed in following up his advantage. As there was not room for the whole of my command on the right of the turnpike, a part of the regiment still occupied the line on the left of the road. During the night there was another short, but severe, fight on our front, in which it was understood the enemy were worsted. In compliance with orders from headquarters, I directed Captain McDonald at 11.30 p. m., to withdraw two companies of his battalion, proceed whit them to Germanna Ford, dismantle his bridge, still in use there, and proceed whit it to Ely's Ford as speedily as possible, an attack at the former place being apprehended. The remaining eight companies remained in the rifle-pits until after daylight on the morning of the 7th. We were not engaged with the enemy while occupying this line, and but little exposed to fire. Our only casualty was 1 man wounded in the head by a piece of shell.

Captain Van Brocklin had reported in the afternoon of the 6th, and as we did not require his company there I sent him to report to the chief engineer, by whom and General Ingalls he was directed to cause all the pontoon trains to be parked near the supply train of the army, they being then in the vicinity of Ely's Ford.

Soon after daylight on the morning of the 7th, I received orders to withdraw my men from the rifle-pits and report in the vicinity of Fifth Corps headquarters. There I was directed by General Warren to build additional communications across Wilderness Run and valley. This work was immediately commenced by nearly the whole command. In about thirty minutes I received orders to have all men under arms and ready to move at a moment's notice and make small details for completing the work. At 11 a. m. I sent word to General Warren that we had twelve corduroy bridges and two fords with approaches compelled across Wilderness Run. He replied that was sufficient; that I should keep the men in readiness for instant use, but that he would not call upon us to act as infantry except in case of absolute necessity, as the Government could not afford to lose the services of our men as engineer soldiers. At 4 p.