enemy were coming down the Orange pike and forming line in front of General Griffin's division; that large clouds of dust were hanging over the road. General Wilson's [cavalry] reported not on the pike, as according to General Humphreys they were ordered to be; 8.40 a. m., sent orders to Colonel Burton; 4.10 p. m., General Hancock's attack commenced, judging from the report of infantry and artillery; 7 p. m., ordered the brigade of artillery reserve, Colonel Kitching, to be sent up by daylight to-morrow to join the attack on the enemy. Two guns lost from Winslow's battery. They were pushed out (and so far as I can learn, a very proper risk) by General Griffin. The troops on their left were driven in. The enemy came behind them from their right; the officers and men mostly killed or captured. The guns laying near our line on the 6th would have been withdrawn by Colonel Wainwright, who had orders for the purpose in the night, but for the report that General Griffin had fallen back early in the evening.

N. B.-General Griffin did not fall back until late at night. Did not inform Colonel Wainwright in time and did not himself recover the guns.

May 6.-3.15 a. m., an officer from Colonel Kitching reports to me the brigade of foot artillery is on the way up, ordered to report to General Warren; 8 a. m., examined ground designated by General Griffin for a large battery. General Griffin proposed to put three or four batteries in position on a ridge in front of the enemy's works, and in an open place some 400 to 500 yards across and between the lines. Colonel Wainwright objected. General Griffin asked that a competent officer might examine the ground. I was sent. Found the enemy intrenched some few hundred yards in front of the proposed place; the guns near where the two guns were lost yesterday extended along our front. On the right our line bent backward, the enemy parallel to it. On the prolongation of the ridge were the enemy's line crossed it, he had guns which completely enfiladed the ridge. The fire of these guns and of the enemy in front, both infantry and artillery, made the position utterably untenable. On my examining the right of the proposed position, Colonel Upton, who was there, strongly remonstrated against placing the guns. First, because the enemy's batteries completely swept the ridge, and was then firing parallel to it and our line and behind us; second, because the artillery fire which it would draw would enfilade our lines of infantry behind the ridge. Again, the worst possible point to make an attack on the enemy was on the works in front of the proposed battery. These views completely coincided with those of Colonel Wainwright and my own. There was but one proper way to act, to throw forward the right of our line (Sixth Corps) to gain the command of the ridge, and then when a flank attack was made on the works in front the battery could be thrown forward to the ridge to aid. The proposition to put the battery on the ridge was a pure absurdity. 10.35 a. m., saw orders dated 10.35 a. m. to Generals Warren and Sedgwick to suspend their attack and report their surplus men with a view to make a concentrated attack on the enemy's right. 1 p. m., ordered by General Meade to place batteries on the ridge east of the plank road so as to command the woods and openings facing toward General Hancock's attack, to be ready to repel the enemy should he succeed in driving Hancock in. 1.10 p. m., ordered one of Edwards' batteries into position on the ridge behind Old Wilderness Tavern; 2 p. m., ordered Major Tompkins to place