of what should be proper line of polocy for the future in Kanawha Valley. He cannot heartily or scarcely at all agree to any action which seems to be contrary to his own whilst there. To fight the enemy, particularly with increased numbers, on the ground over which he has retreated before inferior numbers would seem to acknowledge the retreat itslf to be a blunder, or to enter the valley without a figth would be the strongest possible condemnation of the retreat. But to remain in quarters at the White Sulphur, with the whole northwestern portion of the State blazing with civil war, is what is not long to be endured. I have taken command formally, but his unwillingness to co-operate in a total change of his own policy is so great that it amounts practically almost to open opposition. Of course you must understand that I do not in the least regard this unwilling compliance of the general. I know perfectly wel how to enforce obedience, and will, without the least hesitation, do it. There is no danger of a rupture between us, I think, but it would be far better to observe a certain and cprdoa; co-operation amongst commands in the Kanawha Valley. Wise would serve zealously and cheerfully under General Lee, and more so with any one than with me. If General Wise's legion was ordered to join General Lee as soon as a well-appointed equal force could be sent to replace them with me, the greatest good would result from it. The force to replace Wise should, if possible, come from Kentucky. I think it could be made to tell beneficially upon the norhtern part of that State. I am forty miles west of the White Sulphur Springs, with an inadequate force. My own regiments are now scarcely half their strength from measles. Wise sends me his very grudgingly. My whole force with Wise's will not wxceed 3,000, I think. But every consideration demands that we shall fight the ivading troops whenever we shall meet them, which will probably be in a very few days. Our scouts, under Colonel Heth, had a skirmish with the enemy's scouts yesterday, and so had those under Colonel J. L. Davis. The enemy is supposed to be in force about fifteen miles from this point, advancing upon Lewisburg. I doubt their nubers and their intention both at this time, but from a captured dispatch of Colonel Tyler to General Rosecrans (a copy* of which I send you), their plan cetrainly was to attack Lewisburg. The enemy, if the y come as it is reported will meet us within ten miles of the spot, in the midst of the most sterile and mountainous regions of the State. They are very actively engaged organizing the Peirpoint government. I will advance as best I can to the Ohio River, and with a good force of 5,000 or 6,000 men, under willing, efficient officers, I think the enemy can be driven out and that region be restored to the State. At present the confusin and disaffection there exceed anythink imaginable. I will not trouble you with anything more pertaining to the force here, but hope a short time will develop clearly enough the policy best to be adopted to regulate the forces.

With the highest regard, I am, very truly, your friend,

JOHN B. FLOYD.

[5.]

SPECIAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS MONTEREY LINE,
NORTHWESTERN ARMY, Numbers 78.
Greenbrier River, August 16, 1861.

Colonel Taliaferro will advance to this point as early to-morrow morning as practicable with the Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh Regiments

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* Not found.

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