that, if in nothing else, so great an evil-should not be extended beyond the limits of that necessity which is relied upon as its justification. Hence, therefore, whenever martial law is declared, if you specify the prticular object to which it is to be made appliable, you will not affect the constitution of civil society further than as it is connected with such specified objects. These, then, alone become exceptional matters, and in relation to all others the organization of society retains its harmony; the operations of civil government, except as to these specifield objects, is continued, and all the purposes desired to be assomplished by the declaration of martial law are secured without the disturbances of such other matters as are not necessary to be interfered with. When, however, the declaration of martial law is not limited to specifield objects, and intended for the accomplishment of certain purposes, but is general in its terms and sweeing in its operations, it is then assumed that all law suspended and no rules of conduct are established, except those promulgated under the authority of martial law. This, then, of course, renders it necessary that there should be a new specification of offenses to be punished under the authority of this code. This is not only a work of great labor, altogether unnecessary, but involves this other consequence, that an act, unless so specified as an offense, cannot be punished. No one has held that even under martial law that can be pushed which has not been prohibited; nor has any one ever contended that the offense so declared by the positive laws of the land can be cognizable by martial law unless it has also declared such acts to be offenses; for the theory of martial law suspends those positivbe laws which, because of their vitality, had creted these offenses. You re, therefore, forced, under a general declaration of martial law, either to make a new code of laws graduated to the necessities of each community-a work of great laboror to suffer numerous offenses which societz in its accustomed condition has forbidden to go unpunished, or to declare tat some one person shall, at his discretion, and perchance after its commission, determine whether it is an offense and what shall be its pklunishment.

It is not because you desire to abrogate the positive law or change the form of government that you declare martial law. It is to be presumed that the desire is to preserve these, but that some necessity, controlling in its nature, renders in certain matters this departure necessary. To the extent, therefore, of that necessitz, declare martial law, but no further, because the motive for its declaration will carry you no further; and beyond this the greatest evil is developed and the sdgreatest mischief is produced. But not only would the declaration of the specific objects to which the declaration of martial law is applicable and limited accomplish all that was desired or requred by its declarations, but it would do much more. It would render the application of martial law to these specified objects more certain, because of the co operating influence and aid which the ordinary civil tribunals would afford, continuing as they would in the exercise of their accustomed functions. It is true such aid would be felt indirectly, but not on that account less efficiently

In every large community, like that which makes up the population of a city, there are varied interests which constantly require the protection of civil authority. In the existence of tis civil authority that confidence is felt which is one of the essential bonds of society. Remove it, and you lose all security. Nor is it possible for you to supply that loss by such rules of a military character as you may proclaim