Today in History:

1012 Series I Volume XII-II (Supp.) Serial 17 - Second Manassas Part II (Supplemental)

Page 1012 OPERATIONS IN N. VA., W. VA., AND MD. Chapter XXIV.

Question. State the position and force of the enemy in the immediate vicinity of General Porter's command, as far as you know it.

Answer. Immediately after going there, my skirmishers were fired on by a body of dragoons, and shortly afterward there was a section of artillery which opened fire upon General Porter's command. Soon after that, perhaps about 2 o'clock, the head of a large column came to my front. They deployed their skirmishers and met nine, and about 3 o'clock drove my skirmishers into the edge of the timber. We were all on the left of the Manassas Railroad, going toward Geinesville. This force continued to come down all day, in fact, until 1 o'clock at night. It was a very large force, and they were drawn up in line of battle as they came down. I reported at different intervals to General Morell, my immediate commander, the position of the enemy. But at one time I deemed it so important that I did not dare to trust orderlies or threes with messages, and I went myself up to him, to confer concerning the enemy. This was about dusk. General Morell told me that he had just received orders from General Porter to attack the enemy-to commence the attack with four regiments. He seemed to be very much troubled concerning the order, and asked my advice, my opinion. I told him by all means not to attack; that it was certain destruction for us to do so; that I for one did not wish to go into that timber and attack the enemy. Their position was a very strong one, and they were certainly in force at that time twice as large as our own force-all of General Porter's corps. He had expressed to me the tenor of General Porter's order. I also deemed that we had executed the same with reference to the other part of the army-General Pope's army-by keeping this large body in force, and better than we would by attacking them, because, if we had attacked them, I felt that it was certain destruction, as we would have had to move our line of battle across this ravine into this timber, and then, perhaps, our line of retreat would have been entirely cut off from General Pope's army. I may say that this army that came down in our front was a separate and distrinct army of the enemy form that which we saw General Pope's army fighting with. About the same time, before I went in to General Morell, I could hear and judge of the result of the fighting between the force of the enemy and General Pope's army. I could see General Pope's left and the enemy's right during the greater part of the day, about 2 miles off, perhaps more, diagonally to our front and to the right. The enemy set up their cheering, and appeared to be charging and driving us, so that not a man of my command but what was certain that General Pope's army was being driven from the field. In the different battles I have been, I have learned that there is no mistaking the enemy's yell when they are successful. It is different from that of our own men. Our own men give three successive cheers, and in concert, but theirs is a cheering without any reference to regularity of form-a continual yelling. Afterward, at dark, I was sent for by General Porter, and questioned very stringently with reference to the enemy; and my remarks to him were the same as I am now making,and as I made to General Morell. I also stated in conversation that I felt that our right was very weak, and that the pickets should be increased, for there was danger of our being cut off entirely from General Pope's army; and I was given one regiment under my command to go to the right of me, and four companies of another regiment to go on the left of me, as pickets; sand General Griffin was also ordered to place a strong force on my right, and to connect with me.

Question. The position and force of the enemy being as it was between 5 o'clock and dusk, and the position and force of General Porter being as it was at that time, was it possible, without the greatest danger, for General Porter to have made a movement to his right, to attempt to reach and attack Jackson on his right?

Answer. No, sir; it was impossible to have done so. In the first place, it was impracticable to cross the country in that position during the day. Again, we would have been obliged to have whipped this very force in front of us, large as it was, to have got there, and it was very doubtful if we could have done it.

Question. They would have attacked you in flank if you had attempted that movement?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know that the order to attack, sent to General Morell from General Porter, was predicated upon the news which General Porter had received that the enemy was retiring?

Answer. General Morell told me that the news was that the enemy wires retreating, and, says he, "We know to the reverse; that they are not."

The examination by the accused here closed.


Page 1012 OPERATIONS IN N. VA., W. VA., AND MD. Chapter XXIV.