HDQRS. SECOND DIV. CAVALRY, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
September 3, 1864.

Brigadier General A. V. KAUTZ,

Commanding Cavalry Division:

GENERAL: General Gregg directs me to ask what portion of the right of your line he shall relieve when you send the eight companies of the First District of Columbia Cavalry to this command, and when you purpose sending them. This question with a view to ascertain the time and the point to be taken up by this division. Your communication received just now. Ascertain particulars. Latest news from Atlanta say that Hood left his works, went and fought Sherman, and was whipped. The corps which Sherman left in front Atlanta marched into Atlant, and occupies the place. Very quiet here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. C. WEIR,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., September 4, 1864.

Major-General PARKE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

A line should be selected at once in rear of our present line, and facing from it, which can be taken at any time if the enemy should come in from the rear. Some preparation should also be taken to make it defensible. If Major Duane is not able for such duty no one could select such a line better than General Humphreys.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., September 4, 1864.

Major-General PARKE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

A scout sent from Washington to Gordonsville, and who left the latter place on the 1st instant, reports that Early's forces commenced passing there on the 28th, on their way to Richmond, and were still passing when he left. They avowed their purpose of driving us from the Weldon road. Breckinridge was left in the Valley with orders to hold it. A close watch must be kept upon the enemy, and every preparation made to receive an attack. My own impression is that if the enemy attack, and I expect it, he will hold his present lines from the James River to the Weldon road with a force not exceeding three divisions. With the balance they will likely march entirely around our left and attack in rear near the Jerusalem plank road. Should they do so, all our troops to the left of the point of attack should be instructed to move at once against the enemy, leaving only garrisons for the inclosed works. All troops to the right should also be taken to face the enemy, leaving not to exceed 2,000 men to the mile to hold the entrenchments. With proper vigilance the cavalry will be able to give timely notice of the point of attack, if made.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.