my center. My right and left are also fixed by orders requiring me to make connections with the Ninth and Second Corps. Yesterday my reserves were under orders to move away to the left and for two days previous they were absent by order. The position of my right, center, left, and reserves were thus fixed at your headquarters. I proposed a system of redoubts or masses instead of these continuous long lines, but have received no decision in this matter. If I adopt such a thing myself I know it will require some similar disposition on my right and left and some general consideration along the whole line that I cannot control. They involve also risk, loss of life, and exhausting labor, all of which are of general interest. I cannot work my men after such labors as the two brigades I sent to the left performed, without allowing them rest in this severe weather. As regards my liberty to make changes, I would asks: Can I withdraw to a new line? Can I shorten my line? Can I control my reserves? Artillery is of very little use to me, for I am everywhere in close musketry range.

G. K. WARREN,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 26, 1864-10.30 a.m.

Major-General WARREN,
Commanding Fifth Corps:

Your dispatch of 9.30 a.m. is received. The commanding general instructs me to say that the changes in your position or line of battle that you are considered at liberty to make refer to that part of it in front of the plank road. If in your judgment that part of your line of battle can be made more secure, and the comfort of the troops greater by retiring it to a certain extent, you are at liberty to change it to the extent necessary for those objects, provided the new line fulfills the general conditions of good connections on the right and left, will restrain the enemy within his present works, and enable the offensive to be resumed on your front at any moment. Respecting your reserves, there is nothing transpiring on the left at present that renders it probable that they may be called on for service in this direction. The dispatch of yesterday contemplated their use on the left flank only in the event of an attack there of such a character as would, so far as could be judged, render it highly improbable that they would, so far as could be judged, render it highly improbable that they would be needed on your front.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, June 26, 1864-11.30 a.m.

General MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:

We succeeded in moving our main advanced line out to the skirmish line beyond the railroad cut and within 100 yards of the battery to which we are running the mine, so that the mining party is now pretty well protected. If we are not disturbed to-day I think we can make it so strong to-night that they cannot attack us with much chance of success. We have fine positions for heavy guns. The attack on us last night was feeble, and our loss small.

A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General.