CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,

June 22, 1864-9.25 p.m.

The following has just been received and is communicated for general information.*

The general commanding directs that you hold your command in readiness to move without a moment's delay in the event of being called upon to aid in the attack at 3.30 to-morrow morning. The men should be in readiness to move before the hour specified.

By command of Major-General Burnside:

D. R. LARNED,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS,
June 22, 1864.

General POTTER:

GENERAL: The general commanding desires me to say to you that thought it is not probable that your command will be called upon to move to-night it is important that you should be ready to move at a moment's notice. At the same time he desires that the men take all the rest they can possibly get. The fight this evening has been in front of the Second and Sixth Corps, but the result has not yet been heard at these headquarters.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. R. LARNED,

Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Same to Generals Ledlie, Willcox, and Ferrero.)

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, NINTH ARMY CORPS,
Before Petersburg, June 22, 1864-8 p.m.

Major General JOHN G. PARKE,

Chief of Staff, Ninth Army Corps:

GENERAL: The enemy have very considerably increased the strength of their position in my front. They have also placed guns in position on the front of the First Division so as to enfilade my line. I have ordered some slight changes in the line, traverses strengthened, &c., so as to protect the line as much as possible, but it still remains considerably exposed and must continue to be so. The skirmishing has been pretty severe all day. They advanced vedettes last night in front of their line to the right of the battery and in front of my skirmishers. I do not think now that a surprise would be practicable. I think a front of about 150 to 200 files is all we could get to attack with, with room behind for a second line of the same force. The supporting force would have to be held in reserve under protection of the covered way with the head of the column as near up as it could be got, which is not a very promising way of having them. I do not feel as sanguine of the favorable results of an attack at this point as I did. I have lost considerably to-day in killed and wounded, including some officers, both on the skirmish and main line. I received an order to hold my command in readiness to move in support of Second and Sixth Corps. I supposed that order to include only the brigade I have as support, and not the

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*See Humphreys to Burnside, 9.05 p.m., p. 317.

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