General Banks before I started and he assented to it as a good one. I overtook you before you had gone far and we rode together to the 8-mile point and on to another point about 2 miles farther.

As there was good water here, I directed you to encamp at this place, and your troops did encamp there, General Emory's encamping at the 8-mile point. About 10 o'clock a.m. I received a message from General Lee asking that with him, which had become much exhausted. I consented to send it and your ordered the other brigade of Landram's division to go forward. About the same time you received permission from me to go forward yourself for the purpose of seeing that my wishes were carried out as to the second brigade-that is, to see that it was not put into the fight with the first brigade, but in place of it, unless some great emergency happened. You also desired to see that good dispositions were made of your troops. During the morning I received dispatches from General Lee informing me that he was driving the enemy, but having some loss. General Banks arrived at the point where your troops went into camp about 10.30 a.m., and after waiting there about half an hour, informed me that he would go to the front, and started off. I placed my headquarters near by and waited. At 3.15 p.m. I received the following order from General Banks:

Major General W. B. FRANKLIN,

Commanding, &c.:

The commanding general desires me to say that the enemy are apparently prepared to make a strong stand at this point, and that you had better make arrangements to bring up your infantry and to pass everything on the road. The general will send again when to move. He thinks you had better send back to push up the trains, as manifestly we shall be able to rest here.

I have the honor, general, to be your obedient servant,

GEO. B. DRAKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

I immediately sent out the necessary orders. Not more than ten minutes after the receipt of this order, Lieutenant Sargent, aide-de-camp of General Banks, informed me that the general directed me to move the infantry forward at once. Accordingly Cameron's division at once moved forward, and orders were forthwith sent to General Emory to move his division forward.

Cameron's division arrived on the field at the same time with myself, at about 4.15 p.m. The enemy was then about driving us from the position we held at the edge of the woods. Cameron was the means of holding them in check for forty minutes longer, but after fighting bravely his division was overwhelmed by numbers and gave way. About the time the rout began, I sent word to General Emory to form line of battle across the road at the first good position he arrived at. He obeyed the order promptly and formed about 2 miles in rear of the battle-ground. Here the enemy mae several attacks upon him, but was repulsed in all and darkness ended the battle.

It is my opinion that it was in our power and that it was our duty to have avoided a general battle on that day, and that the cause of our disaster was the order sending a brigade of infantry to the front. The disaster was magnified by the cavalry train being too near to the front, but that train was by no means the first cause of the disaster. It was great carelessness to allow it so near the front. I do not know who is responsible for this mistake. I did not recollect that the artillery of Landram's division was ordered to the front. I was