put in motion and moved as steadily as possible, considering the difficulties presented by broken ground and dense undergrowth. Hughey's battery was et to work to attract attention from this movement. The division was delayed half an hour longer from engagement than I anticipated, owing to the nature of the ground. Desultory firing had been going on for some time, followed by very heavy firing, and learning that the enemy was pressing hard upon Gano's brigade, right of Maxey's division, I threw Greene's brigade of Missourians, Of Marmaduke's command, to its relief. This bridge went gallantly and with a will to its work. It arrived on the right of Gano's brigade just as the engagement on that part of the line became heavy and general, a part of the enemy's line having fallen back. Hot work was going on all along the line from the right of Greene's to the left of the Choctaw brigade, the extreme left of the line. One continued shout was heard, and an unfaltering advance of all that part of the line. Cabell's division was immediately ordered forward, going in splendidly, charring in double-quick over the open field into the fight. The fight was now general all along the line, our men pressing forward and the enemy giving back everywhere. Not a false step had been made; not a position attacked but was taken. The road was gained and the coveted train in our possession. Step by step the enemy had withdrawn his artillery, but his forces, being routed, abandoned it, and his battery of four pieces fell into our possession. Our troops, exultant with victory, pressed forward for more than 2 miles, when they were recalled by me to complete the task we came to perform. The brigade were reformed, details rapidly made, and the train put in motion on the road to Woodlawn, where the last of it arrived in safety, together with the battery, about midnight.

The battle of Poison Spring was fought about 10 miles from Camden. Our force was between Camden and the enemy. Of the force in front I had no fears. The force in rear at Camden was known to be greatly superior to us in numbers, and could at any time after they were notified by the artillery have moved on our rear.

To secure the train I moved Cabell up the road toward Camden, left Marmaduke in rear, moved Maxey's division in front of the train, and requested Fagan, who was on the middle Camden road, to hold that position, and re-enforced him with Gano's brigade, of Maxey's division. This made the road over which the captured property passed as safe as it could be with the force in hand. About thirty wagons, without teams and some broken, were saved; the artillery also. The enemy's force was about 2,500. At no time did we have that many engaged. His loss in killed and wounded will reach 650. The proportion of killed was variously estimated at from 300 to 500. I know they were thick.

In making a report where my knowledge of the troops with whom I have been associated but a very short time (except my own division) is necessarily imperfect, I fear to do injustice unintentionally, the more so that in this report I have not the benefit of General Marmaduke's report of his division. I can only say, so far as my observation extended every officer and man did his whole duty. The plan of battle was in every particular carried out. Hughey's battery by its timely and splendid work drew attention from Maxey's division, and in turn that and Greene's brigade, with the unerring fire