and "out" of Alexandria. From that time my action seemed almost uniformly to meet with the disapprobation of the major-general commanding District of West Louisiana. Nor can I deem that he acted justly toward me or becomingly to himself in not sending a competent staff officer to examine into the causes of such portions of my conduct as he complained of before publishing his dissatisfaction.

In accordance with the foregoing strategic views, on April 24, at 6 a. m., I pushed my little command into Pineville, making 90 miles in thirty-six hours, fired into the gun-boats that were in Alexandria, and was fired upon my artillery from the opposite side, which after a few rounds suddenly ceased and withdrew to the rear of Alexandria. It was supposed that the enemy apprehended a co-operating attack from that side, thus in dict in his weakness and the correctness of my conclusions as to the propriety of an attack upon Alexandria. Finding I could do nothing more, the stores and boats being all on the opposite side, I withdrew the command to Bynum's Mill. The enemy's boats having not yet passed down, I pushed a squadron into the river at Montgomery's, a regiment opposite Deloach's Bluff, and the remainder of the command still farther below, at Bush's place. I continued the sharpshooting on the river until the 28th, when it was discovered that a cavalry force of several hundred men was moving toward my rear late in the evening. This afterward proved to be a party making a reconnaissance of my position, and which returned to Pineville the same night. On the 29th, I sent detachments on the river around Pineville to make demonstrations on the forces guarding the works at the falls. On the night of the 30th, the enemy moved out a brigade of cavalry, followed by infantry, which last was delayed on the road until the cavalry should get into position in my rear. My command was then at Thornton's place, on Bayou Rigolette. As soon as this movement to attempt to capture my command was discovered, knowing that the enemy would fall upon my camp early next morning, I threw out two squadrons to find out his exact locality, and moving the remainder of my command under cover of darkness by a detour to the left, about sunrise next morning fell upon his rear at Hadnot's place, surprising him instead of being surprised. Attacking him on the flank as well as rear, and charging him hotly, compelled him to withdraw hastily and in confusion to Pineville, pursued by a portion of my command. His infantry force had not been able to come up, as the capture of a staff officer of General Banks prevented the order being conveyed to it. The enemy's force was henceforth concentrated at Alexandria, occupying both sides of the river, and engaged in constructing works on the river for the passage of the boats, his infantry from the transports and gun-boats guarding this operation being not far from 4,000 men. Having no artillery, I was unable from this time to do much more than skirmish with him whenever opportunity presented and observe his movements.

On May 6, an attack was made by the enemy on our forces on the opposite side of the river, driving them back far toward the rear in the direction of McNutt's Hill. Not understanding it, I sent an officer over to ascertain the facts, if possible. At the same time the two 24-pounders sent from the Ouachita had reached the vicinity of Bynum's Mill, 8 miles from my encampment. As a precautionary measure I withdrew the available forces,except the pickets to cover