of which his brigade was composed, was unwilling to attempt any hazardous enterprise, and this disinclination to risk his command prevailed with him to the end while under my direction. In consequence of these representations and the immediate retirement of the enemy to their boats (they not having come out more than half a mile), my design was not executed. The enemy, instead of pushing after Lieutenant-Colonel McNell, as was expected, retreated to his boats, burned a portion of Campti, re-embarked, and moved up the river. On finding this to be the case I sent to the river at various points detachments of sharpshooters, to fire upon all exposed men on the boats, keeping up this annoyance to the enemy as far as the mouth of Boggy Bayou. At Grappe's bluff the armed steamer Benefit was disabled by the two sections of artillery at 100 yards' range.

On April 11, the fleet started back from the mouth of Boggy Bayou. From that time to the 15th I kept the boats constantly annoyed with sharpshooters and checking the progress of the entire fleet at Berdelon's Point for twenty-four hours with the two sections of artillery under command of Captain Fauntleroy, until it became necessary fort hem to send our a considerable force of infantry from their boats to cover their passage down. On their return to Campti, which was not far from Berdelon's Point by land, by way of retaliation, they burned the remaining portion of the place. The boats having reached Grand Ecore, where General Banks was moving his force with the supposed intention of crossing to the east side of Red River, it became necessary for me to cross Black Lake to get below them and to head Saline Lake to get below Saint Maurice, which is at the mouth of Saline Bayou, on Red River. Here I was compelled to send the artillery to the rear on account of the great difficulty in crossing these lakes and the poor condition of the horses, and before it could reach me again it was ordered to Arkansas, the order from department headquarters reaching it when within a few miles of my camp, giving it that destination.

On the 17th, while camped on Bayou Des Cedars, 8 miles from Saint Maurice, a force of the enemy attempted to surprise my camp, but were repulsed a retired hastily, followed by a squadron, which found them prepared to receive us at Strong's Ferry with artillery and quite a large force of cavalry, which had been turned back from the intended surprise by the confusion at the head of their column and by exaggerated reports of the strength of my command.

From that time to the 27th, the enemy seeming to be stationary above Saline Bayou and at Grand Ecore, I could only use detachments of sharpshooters on the river operating against those boats that were passing down to Alexandria. Such being the position of the enemy-stationary at Natchitoches and at Grand Ecore (150 miles by water and 70 by land from Alexandria), and reported to be on short rations-it occurred to me that a directs movement of our forces upon Alexandria to destroy the supplies already accumulated there, and to prevent the passage of transports up the river carrying supplies and re-enforcements, would tend largely to demoralize and disintegrate the army under General Banks, placing at the same time the fleet of the enemy more completely in our power than was possible at any other point, and leaving a retreat by him to Natchez as the only alternative.

I had the honor to suggest this movement to the major-general commanding the District of West Louisiana, but the only intimation received by way of answer was that he intended to drive them "in"