one of these difficulties have been avoided the object of the campaign would have been accomplished. But the occupation of Shreveport could not have been maintained. The presence of the enemy would have required such a force for this defense as could not have been supplied by the river, and for which no other arrangement had been made, as suggested in my dispatch of the 30th of March. The only possible method of maintaining this position would have been to concentrate at this point a force superior in numbers to the enemy, with sufficient time to pursue him wherever he should move, even if it took us to Galveston, on the Gulf coast. This was suggested as a possible result of the campaign, but it was not embraced within the original plan, and was specially precluded by orders received from the lieutenant-general commanding the armies.*

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS,

Major-General Volunteers.

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

[Inclosure Numbers 1.]

From Major-General Banks to Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge.

GRAND ECORE, LA., April 17, 1864.

* * * * *

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date. On the 15th, I had an interview with Admiral Porter, in which our position was fully discussed, but did not know that he was to leave this post.

In reference to the operations of the army, I can only say at present that we are here under instructions from the Government to move upon Shreveport in co-operation with the forces of General Steele. General Steele failed to co-operate with us, as far as we can learn, and thus far renders us no assistance. I have sent to him by the way of Little Rock and requested him to join us upon the line of the river, where we can move forward in column against the enemy. With the co-operation of his forces our occupation of Shreveport is certain and immediate. It is impossible to say at this time whether we shall receive that co-operation or not. Until it is ascertained definitely that this part of the plan of the Government at Washington will fails us, and that my force is insufficient to advance farther upon this line against the enemy, who appears to be in full force, I shall entertain no thought of a retrograde movement, certainly not if it leaves the navy in any danger. No such purpose is contemplated now. I have sent for all the troops that can be gathered from my own department to move to this point immediately. I have also requested, as I have said, the co-operation of General Steele. * * *

In my interview with the admiral he expressed the utmost confidence in the rise of the river, and did not speak upon the subject of the withdrawing either of his vessels or the troops. His last suggestion to me was that it would be imprudent for me to advance until the river should rise.

* * * * * *

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*A map illustrating the campaign under General Banks, prepared to accompany his report, will appear in the Atlas. Maps of the combats at Fort De Russy, Henderson's Hill, Willson's Farm, Sabine Cross-Roads, Pleasant Grove, Pleasant Hill, Monett's Bluff, and Mansura follow on pp. 224-235.

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