On the night of the 24th I gain assumed command, and before daylight of the 25th was moved out and took position. Our camp was on the Marais des Cygnes River, in Linn Country, Kans. I was ordered to form two miles south of that stream with Burbridge's regiment. The remainder of Marmaduke's brigade was still in the rear, and engaged the enemy for a few minutes, retired beyond me, and reformed. I occupied my position about half an hour, when Burbridge's regiment, with the brigade, was withdrawn, and I was ordered by General Marmaduke to move in rear. The country was a continuous prairie, and the enemy soon appeared in sight. After marching about a mile I was ordered to quicken my gait, then to trot, and finally to join the main body at a gallop. We had now marched some five or six miles, followed by the enemy, who seemed to take his gait from ours, but never came in gunshot range. On reaching the main body I found it formed some 300 yards north of Mine Creek-a deep, lightly wooded stream with abrupt caving banks-and was ordered into position in rear and to the right of Williams' battery. The main line wa less than eighty yards from me, and another line covered half of my regiment, and was not exceeding twenty yards from it. I was notified that I was in reserve. We were mounted. I am thus explicit in describing the position of my regiment, in order to explain or extenuate the disaster which soon after overtook it, and which without explanation would leave a stigma upon its bright and dearly bought reputation. After a slight skirmish the enemy was seen to deploy from behind the left of his line in heavy column of attack, completely turning our right. Suddenly the first and second lines gave way, and rushing in great disorder ran over and broke the eight right companies of my regiment. The same wild panic seemed to seize everything. I wheeled my remaining company (B) to the right and opened on the flank of the enemy's column until two of Williams' guns were borne to the rear, when after every exertion, seeing the impossibility of staying this panic-stricken mob, I ordered Captain Polk (Company B) to withdraw as best he could.

Two hours later and near the Osage River I was placed in command of the brigade, and collected about 400 armed men, not including Wood's battalion, which did not report until the day following. Over two-thirds of the arms were lost in the rout. With this force, under General Clark's directions, I moved across the Osage and went into position five miles beyond on the Fort Scott road, the brigade composing a part of the right wing. The enemy had been in the meantime engaged by Shelby's division, which retired to the rear. We advanced upon the enemy as soon as he appeared in sight, and a sharp fusilade was kept up with slight loss to either side. The enemy seemed unwilling to press his advantage further, and after checking his pursuit we withdrew at dark.

Among the many officers who bore themselves with marked gallantry on this memorable and disastrous day I cannot forbear to record the names of Lieutenant-Colonel Ward and Captain Power, of the Eighth; Lieutenant-Colonel Preston, of the Fourth; Lieutenant Snapp, of the Third, and Captains Barry and Burr, of the Tenth, whose conduct came under my immediate notice.

I was again indebted to Captain George W. Kerr for valuable assistance in times of danger, and in bearing tribute to his gallantry it reminds me to add the names of Privates Simpson and Adams, Company B, Third Regiment, who performed all the duties of staff officers with courage and skill.