first. When he reached Prairie D'Ane two routes were open to him-the one to Marshall crossing the river at Fulton, the other direct to Shreveport. I consequently held Price's infantry a few days at Shreveport, when Steele's hesitation and the reports of the advance of Banks' cavalry caused me to move it to Keachie, a point twenty miles in rear of Mansfield, on the road where it divides to go to Marshall and Shreveport. It was directed to report to General Taylor. I now visited and conferred with General Taylor. Neither believed that Banks could get advanced his infantry across the barren country stretching between Natchitoches and Mansfield. I returned to Shreveport and wrote to General Taylor instructing him to choose a position in which to fight, and move a reconnaissance in force and compel the enemy to display his infantry; to notify me as soon as he had done so, and I would join him in the front. I hoped to derive an element of morale from the arrival of Churchill's command and my own presence at the moment of action. The reconnaissance was converted into a decisive engagement with the advance corps of the enemy (a portion of the Thirteenth and his cavalry), and by the rare intrepidity of Mouton's division resulted in a complete victory over the forces engaged. General Taylor pushed forward his troops in pursuit, met, engaged, and repulsed the Nineteenth Corps, which was hastening to the support of the Thirteenth Corps. Price's infantry came up from Keachie that night. The next morning our whole army advanced and found the enemy in position at Pleasant Hill. Our troops attacked with vigor and at first with success, but by a superiority of numbers were finally repulsed and thrown into confusion. The Missouri and Arkansas troops, with a brigade of Walker's division, were broken and scattered. The enemy recovered cannon which we had captured, and two of our pieces were left in his hands. To my great relief I found in the morning that the enemy had fallen back during the night. He continued his retreat to Grand Ecore, where he intrenched himself and remained until the return of his fleet and its passage over the bars, made especially difficult this season by the unusual fall of the river. The question may be asked why the enemy was not pursued at once. I answer, because our troops were completely paralyzed by the repulse at Pleasant Hill, and the cavalry, worn by the long march from Texas, had been constantly engaged for three days, almost without food or forage.

Before we could reorganize at Mansfield and get into condition to advance over the fifty-five miles of the wilderness which separated the armies, the enemy was re-enforced and intrenched at Grand Ecore. If we could not whip him at Pleasant Hill in a fair fight, it would have been madness to have attacked him at Grand Ecore in his intrenchments, supported by a formidable fleet of gun-boats. No sustained operations for dislodging him could be undertaken, because it was impossible to transport supplies for the entire army from Shreveport, distant 100 miles. The enemy held possession of the river until he evacuated Grand Ecore. A large steam-boat which had been sunk in the narrowest part of the channel for the purpose of obstructing the passage upward of this fleet had to be removed before the river could again be used. Here occurred the most perplexing movement of the campaign to me. Should I with the bulk of my forces pursue Banks until he left the Red River Valley, or should I march against Steele, who threatened my depots and workshops, the loss of which would well nigh have closed operations in this department? I determined upon the latter, and for the following reasons:

I have stated that my original plan was, if possible, to mass my whole force against a single column of the enemy. This had been done successfully against Banks. Steele was still slowly advancing from the Little Missouri to the Prairie D'Ane. I deemed it imprudent to follow Banks below Grand Ecore and leave Steele so near Shreveport. Were I able to throw Banks below Grand Ecore and leave Steele so near Shreveport. Were I able to throw Banks across the Atchafalaya, the high water of that stream would arrest my further progress. If Red River continued to fall it seemed probable that Banks would be compelled to withdraw to Alexandria. It was hoped that the falls would detain him there until we could finish Steele, when the entire force of the department would be free to operate against him.

I confidently hoped that if I could reach Steele with my infantry to beat him at a distance from his depot, in a poor country, and with my large cavalry force destroy his army. The prize would have been the Arkansas Valley and the fortifications of Little Rock, now too strong to be taken by either siege or assault with any force at my command. By the time my infantry reached Shreveport Steele had moved by his left flank to Camden. He held the fortifications we had constructed there. They were strong.

I could not think of allowing Steele time to establish himself finally in Camden. I moved upon the place. The enemy abandoned it. I pursued, overtook, and beat him at the Saline. I failed to accomplish what I had reasonably hoped for, but succeeded in driving Steele from the valley of the Ouachita, with signal loss of men and material and left myself free to move my entire force to the support of Taylor.

After the enemy left Grand Ecore, General Taylor attacked his rear at Cloutierville, while a part of his force held his front in check at Monett's Ferry.