First. Captain Parker, of the Marion Battery, the most efficient, reported that he had exhausted all his shells and had but a few round shot left.

Second. The men were exhausted by rapid, long night marches, want of food, and by constant watching and fighting for two days and nights.

Third. Major Jenkins returned and reported that he found they had about 300 men,whom he could see in reserve, well posted, with three pieces of artillery at the Haulover, and there were two large gun-boats and two tugs just off the mouth of Bohicket, in the Edisto, and a small gun-boat was reported in the Kiawah as high up as she could get, and in range, and I was uncertain as to the number the enemy had on Kiawah Island.

Fourth. There was no practicable way to flank them, and the lower part of the Bohicket road in front his very narrow, between high ditch banks, dense woods on either side at some places, and tangled hedge-rows at other places, the whole way impassable at night but in columns on the roads, which could be easily swept.

Fifth. The possibly of being flanked by boats and barge right and left.

Sixth. The lateness of the hour: a pursuit would have brought us to the Haulover in the night.

Seventh. All the lower ground for a considerable distance from the Haulover was in range of the gun-boats on both sides.

Eighth. The danger of the enemy getting in my rear at Walpole's or on th Burgess road from Legareville.

Ninth. The hazard of withdrawing from John's Island in case of a disaster, there being but one bridge (that at Church Flats), and John's Island Ferry being useless for more than two or three companies in rapid retreat.

Tenth. The object of relieving General Colquitt as certainly and soon as possible.

Eleventh. Colonel Zachry had not come up, and my force were weakened by a reserve left at Walpole's and by the large number of pickets and vedettes I had to place on the Legareville and Edendale roads.

Twelfth. The want of sufficient cavalry.

For these reasons I determined to rest on my lines for the night and move early the next morning. In this conclusion General Colquitt concurred; but I put forward all the available cavalry I had (about 40 men) to pursue and watch the enemy closely and to report their movements; and i ordered a section of Kanapaux's battery (two Napoleons) to be met and sent over Church bridge to Rose Dew, on the Wadmalaw Island, to enfilade their reserve and rear at the Haulover from the opposite side of the Bohicket. Up to about 4 o'clock the reports were that they were strongly picketed about a mile or more above the Haulover. At 4 a. m. on the 12th, their gunboats commenced to shell heavily, and I inferred at once they were covering a retreat, and commenced to move as early as possible.

My orders at 6 a. m. were to advance upon the enemy, General Colquitt on the left, Colonel page on the right of the Bohicket road; Major Jenkins in front, with cavalry to be dismounted when near the enemy, and four companies of infantry to act as skirmishers and flankers; Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper, with the artillery, to advance on the Bohicket road between the two wings of the main body; and the orders were to drive the enemy across the Haulover or to crush