ples are unlimited. The solicitude which I felt for this train caused me to detach a brigade and send it to the rear while in the presence of the army, at the very time I was most likely to need the train, thus losing its used and that of a brigade beside. The commanding general shared this solicitude with me at that time.

General Gregg, independently of my action, made precisely the same disposition of his ambulance train that I did-sent it to the rear, and it joined me at Catlett's Station. His trains (that allowed one cavalry division and a few of our own) sufficed to carry off all our wounded in the fight at Bristoe. Viewing and ambulance train simply as a humane institution, I think it may be assumed that if it appreciably diminishes the fighting force in the time of action, or if it necessitates an action at an improper place, or prevents our movements from being timely, or in any way affects the success of the body to which it is attached, it defeats its own object. It should be reduced just to that limit which will allow a sufficient force to gather the wounded, after the battle at the point is decided, to the most convenient places to receive the attention and care of the nurses and surgeons, and not with any view of transporting them any distance from the field. In the event of being driven from the field, details of surgeons and attendants should be left to care for the wounded. This is more humane than carrying them away by causing less suffering and loss of life, and only those need be left who are badly wounded in the body or lower limbs. This I think should be done with bad cases of fever and other diseases. So pertinaciously has our own medical department clung to its sick in many of our movements to the front, even hen expecting an engagement we have set our with our ambulances full with the sick. When I went forward with our cavalry to Culpeper on September 13, I had to send back our ambulances filled with the sick brought along from beyond the Rappahannock, and send to General Newton for the ambulances of the First Corps to take the wounded cavalrymen.

I have heard it argued in favor of keeping our own large ambulance train that we would be all prepared when the regiments were filled up. I think such foresight might be classed with that of Mrs. Toodles in the play. Nor do I wish to be considered as treating this subject with levity by this comparison, for my feelings are very much like Mr. Toodles' were.

Responsible as I am for the safety and success of the command with which I am instructed, I claim to know better with my experience what is better in any subordinate part of my command even than the officer who devotes himself to that part especially. Of what use would this ambulance train be on a lost battle-field, and of what avail would be to my reputation to plead then excess of incumbrance of which I have so often complained? I cannot abandon this property without dishonor if it is assigned to me, and thus in fighting-it may be to save it-I fight to save honor and not the incumbrance. but this is not true warfare, that has for its object injury to the enemy with the least to ourselves, and no army is properly organized that contains anything to interfere with this. The excess of ambulances and details therefore, I think, form a considerable part of that impedimenta with which, in my opinion, this army has always been unnecessarily afflicted.

I will close this lengthy report by urging that the provisions of