could have held against any force the enemy could bring to bear against him, yet, instead of occupying them, after exchanging a few shots, in which 1 of his men was wounded and 2 of the enemy killed and 2 wounded, he ordered a retreat across the field, which seems to have been accomplished very precipitately, especially when taking into consideration the fact that the enemy did not pursue him but a few rods, and that too on foot. Four of his men got lost from the balance. He proceeded in a westerly, circuitous route to Decatur, where he arrived the evening of the same day with 12 of his men.

In the mean time I had arrived to within 2 miles of the place where he was attacked before the enemy had left, and think I would have been in time to have done them justice had I halted to chastise some guerrillas who had the impudence to fire into my rear guard; but as it was we arrived just in time to see the chivalry put spurs to their horses and leave hurriedly to the eastward, thus showing conclusively that the enemy did not follow our cavalry. We bivouacked that night 23 miles from Decatur and within 1 mile of where the skirmish too place.

The next day was spent in ascertaining what we could relative to the extent of the damage done to the cavalry and in notifying the people in the mountains that they could now have a chance to join the Union Army. I ascertained the loss of our cavalry in the engagement to be 1 man missing, who, when last seen, some 2 miles from where the skirmish took place, was wounded in the thigh (not seriously), and 1 taken prisoner; 1 horse, killed and 1 disabled. Three cavalrymen came in early in the morning without horses, but our boys succeeded in finding the horses and equipments near where they were left. The captain's sword was also found about 100 rods from where fight occurred.

I soon became convinced that the time set for me to return was insufficient to fully accomplish the object of my mission. The news of the defeat of our cavalry spread over the country like a fire on a praise, causing great consternation among the Union people and boldness on the part of the guerrillas. The guides became frightened, and it was very difficult to induce them to leave my command. However, after laboring under all these difficulties we succeeded in bringing back with us 150 volunteers. Several small parties that started to join us failed to get there in time. One party, numbering 34 men, were within 20 miles of us at daylight the morning we left, and although a messenger arrived giving me that information when we had marched but a short distance on you return, yet I was ordered to return within four day's time and could wait no longer.

At 11 a. m. yesterday we took up our line of march for Decatur, and when we had proceeded about 4 miles from our encampment we were informed that the enemy's cavalry, about 500 strong, were posted at the crossing of the road, about 1 mile ahead. The country being thickly wooded, I had nothing to fear from mounted men, but supposing that they might dismount and act as infantry, I deployed Companies A and F on each side of the road in advance as skirmishers, at the same time ordering Company D forward in the road to form a reserve, and also to deploy 6 men in advance to act as signal-men, one company having been previously detailed to act as rear guard. They too were ordered to throw out skirmishers on the flanks, to avoid an undiscovered approach from either of these directions. The Alabamians had previously been placed next to the rear guard. having advanced the skirmishers and advance reserve some 400 yards I ordered three whole battalion to move forward, each individual and company to keep