ious to go with his regiment to bring them in. You can order an expedition of this kind. In doing so it will be necessary to send another regiment to take Colonel Streight's place Decatur. It will not be practicable for you to cross cavalry over to send, but the colonel can take any cavalry that may be at Decatur. Instruct Colonel Streight to be cautions, and not expose his command to ambuscade or surprise or to attack from superior force. He should not be gone more than three or four days, and must take no baggage. He must be careful and not let the people suppose that his presence indicates a permanent, and thus lead them into demonstrations for which the rebels would make them suffer after our withdrawal.

Give such orders for the details and precautionary instructions as the case may seem to you to require.

JAMES B. FRY,

Colonel and Chief of Staff.

Upon the receipt of the above I proceeded to get my command in readiness for the expedition as quickly as possible. Four days' rations were ordered and one camp kettle to each company. The haversacks holding only three day's rations, we filled the kettles and buckets out of the remainder, and decided to get along as best we could under the circumstances. The guides were selected to conduct us to the Union settlement, who were also tact as couriers to inform their fiends of the nature of our mission. There were but 16 men and the captain of Company D, First Ohio Cavalry, at Decatur, who were also put in readiness to march.

In accordance with these arrangements, we moved off at daylight on the direction of a place called Davis' Gap, some 9 miles southeast of Danville and 25 south of Decatur. The cavalry were thrown out in the advance a suitable distance to give notice of the approach of an enemy, and a strong advance and rear guard was at all times kept in readiness for immediate act. When we had proceeded some 12 miles on our way, being unable to hear anything of the enemy, I ordered the captain commanding the cavalry to proceed with his command in advance with three of the guides and escort them, as far toward Davis'' Gap as he should deem safe, so as to allow the guides to give the information to the Union people that we were coming. I gave him the most positive instructions to make diligent inquiry relative to the enemy, and to go no farther than he could with perfect safety, and as soon as he arrived near enough to the mountains to enable the guides to get through he should fall back at once and rejoin me, I at this time ascertained that it would in all probability be necessary for me to go about 23 miles, instead of 15, the distance I at first expected, but did not expect be able to get through the first day.

Under these instructions he proceeded somewhat faster than the infantry could march, consequently when he arrived some 22 miles from Decatur (10 miles from where he left us) he was probably not more than 5 or 6 miles ahead of my regiment; but it being very hot in the middle of the day, we halted to rest, expecting the cavalry to rejoin us, as ordered. In direct disobedience to my orders, the cavalry spent about an hour's time in scouting about the country after they had escorted the guides to within 3 miles of the mountains, after which they stopped at a Mr. Menter's house and ordered dinner; there they spent about three hours more. The captain was warned when he first arrived in the neighborhood that 40 of the enemy's cavalry were within 6 miles of him; yet with these facts before him, as I have above shown, he spent nearly four hours in the neighborhood and at Mr. Menter's house a sufficient time of have returned to Decatur, if necessary, much less to rejoin me.

At about 5.30 o'clock he was attacked by upward of 40 of the enemy's cavalry and guerrillas. Here again his conduct seems to have been very injudicious, for although there were several log buildings that he