ber of troops and the amount of transportation you had with you and the time it took you to cross?

The river is a narrow stream, running through a very mountainous, broken country, sometimes with very precipitous hills for its banks. It is a stream full of very deep pools, but at that season of the year there was little water in running over shoals. I cannot state what transportation I had; I do not remember. I am not sure what portion of my command crossed Rockcastle River. One division, I think, did not cross the river. I rather think two divisions did. As to means of crossing the river, I required none; I do not suppose there were 4 inches of water on the ford. We had no difficulty in crossing, and no more time was occupied in crossing, or very little more, than at any other portion of the march. It was up hill and down merely. The time we lost was not produced by any difficulty we encountered at the ford. I do not now remember certainly whether we were stopped at all by the rebel cavalry there. They planted their guns and resisted us a little at every advantageous place, but my recollection is that just at that ford we were not delayed, though I cannot be positive about that.

Question. Did not Major-General McCook, in failing to make the reconnaissance ordered by General Buell and reporting the same to headquarters, as he was directed to do, on the 8th of October, really bring on the disaster of that day and keep the general in command in ignorance of it until too late to remedy the disaster-supposing the fact is before you?

Even supposing the fact that he failed to make the reconnaissance which he was ordered to make, I cannot say what effect that neglect or failure of General McCook had upon the events of the day. I cannot say, therefore, that such failure brought on the disaster. I do not know precisely the object of the reconnaissance and I cannot say that General McCook kept the general in command in ignorance; but if he did keep the general in ignorance of so important a fact as the repulse of that day until it was too late for the general to remedy the disaster then undoubtedly he was greatly to blame in my judgment.

Question. As General Gilbert with two divisions was in close proximity to General McCook's army corps, was it not his duty to be in front instead of in the rear with the reserve division, and had he been so is it possible that he would have been ignorant of the battle?

My idea of the proper position for the general commanding an army corps is that it should be at some central point most accessible to all his command and that it should be in the rear. As to whether he should have been with the two front divisions or with the reserve division I cannot say. If the reserve division was near enough really to support his two divisions in front and occupied a central position, I should say that that was his proper position. I was not on the ground occupied by General Gilbert or any portion of his command, and I cannot say whether he would possibly have been ignorant of the battle had he been with his two front divisions. I was not very far from General Gilbert, I presume not over 2 miles, and I certainly was ignorant of it; but I do not know that the 2 miles which separated me from General Gilbert would have enabled me or him if up to the front to have heard the battle.

Question. Do you know that Captain Gilbert, quartermaster or assistant quartermaster, disguised himself in a major-general's uniform and reported himself as such to General Buell?

I do not, sir; nor do I believe that such is the fact.

Question. Have you not seen him wearing two stars on a major-general's uniform?

Frequently.

Question. Is he a major-general now?

I understand he is not.

Question. Do you think an officer educated at West Point would have known that no one but the President had the right to appoint a major-general?