Munfordville was threatened, and while at Bowling Green we heard that Colonel Wilder had succeeded in repulsing the enemy. From that time there was clearly indignation among both officers and men. It was because we were not allowed to attack the enemy. From the time we fell back that feeling exhibited itself more particularly, but when we left Gallatin and proceeded toward Mitchellsville it in creased, and then again at Bowling Green, knowing that Colonel Wilder was threatened, and hearing he was attacked the feeling further increased.

Question. Was your division anxious to move alone to the relief of Munfordville?

I never heard any remark that I know of relative to it. My remarks to relieving Munfordville applied to the general feeling in camp. There was nothing said as to whether one division should go or not. It seems to me that would be somewhat inconsistent. To send one division would not have been very good judgment. I never heard an officer remark as to whether one division should move up or not. My impression is that the desire was not that one division should move up.

Question. Was there any judgment at all in this impatience; any knowledge of the position of the enemy, or of his strength, or of the force available to operate against him, or of the movements of other division of the army, or of the circumstances that controlled those movements?

I think had become generally known and satisfactory understood that the enemy had a force of about 30,000 to 35,000; that their position was on the northward, nearly opposite our forces; and it was generally known that Colonel Wilder or a force was at Munfordville, and also that the route taken by the enemy was in that direction. As to the movements of other division of the army, as to how they should move, I do not think it was known whether they could be spared or not. I do not think it was known what was detaining them. For my own part I did not, though I endeavored to keep myself pretty well posted. The facts that would make up the feeling in camp either for or against certain movements are not generally founded upon close calculation, though it is impossible for officers in a subordinate position to know why certain movements are made or why they are not.

Question. Toward whom was the impatience felt when General McCook returned after his expedition up the Sequatchie Valley?

The conversation and feeling turned upon the party responsible. It is very customary for conversations and observations to be made in the army without being directed against any individual. It was generally remarked and believed that the enemy were not in sufficient force to warrant our returning without at least an attempt to feel his position. It was not generally believed that the artillery could not be taken over the mountain, and that was the reason assigned for our not advancing farther there - that the artillery could not be taken over the mountain.

Question. Whose opinion was that supposed to be and who was supposed to be responsible for the attempt not being made?

The conclusion that I came to from what I heard was that the responsibility was thrown upon General McCook. I heard some remark that he had been ordered back. The opinion was rather divided and not definitely understood.

Commission adjourned to meet December 15,at 10 o'clock a.m.

NASHVILLE, December 15, 1862.

Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell.

General THOMAS J. WOOD (a witness for the Government), being duly sworn, testified as follows:

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Please state your name and position in the United States Army.

My names is Thomas J. Wood. I am colonel of the Second Regular Artillery and brigadier-general of volunteer forces.