RICHMOND, October 5, 1863.

General G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Charleston, S. C.:

It is impossible to send by the railroads the mules and ambulances required by General Bragg. Your supply exceeds that of the other armies. You are, therefore, desired to send to General Bragg forty-five ambulances and 200 mules.

S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN LINES,
James Island, October 5, 1863.

Captain NANCE,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have been directed by telegraph to report to district headquarters, in writing, my "ideas of an advance against Charleston from North Edisto."

The enemy's object in selecting this line would be to obtain a point-d'appui from which a sap could be pushed with decisive results against the body of the place and at the same time to effect a practical investment of the town. Charleston Neck would be the point aimed at. In reaching this point, he would probably adopt the plan of pushing a strong column of light troops at once of a point above Bee's Ferry, on the Ashley, where the river may be pontooned or is fordable, and effecting the investment of the tow, while he would, for the purpose of securing his communications, primarily direct his main operations against our defenses in Saint Andrew's Paris. Under the difficulties he would have to encounter in field transportation, I take it that water transportation to a point on the main in Saint Andrew's east of Rantowles would be of the highest consequence with him.

Unless he came in overwhelming force, the safety of his communications from this point to the Neck, would require a reduction of our works in Saint Andrew's-an operations resulting in delay, but which would be attended with the advantage of giving him positions for shelling the city across the Ashley, and, further, of seriously jeopardizing the safety of our troops on James Island.

Should his force, however, be sufficiently large to cover his lines of communication with sufficient force, he might neglect the Saint Andrew's works, and proceed at once to siege operations on the Neck.

The enemy's points of debarkation would be Seaborok Island, at the mouth of the North Edisto and White Point, at the head of the inlet on the main. The disposition of our troops to meet him should be an advanced cavalry force of, say, 1,500 men, with six, or eight pieces of horse artillery, to dispute his march across John's Island, falling back to Church Flats in retreat, while the main body of our forces should be stationed along the line of the Wadmalaw and Stono Rivers, from White Point to Church Flats; the reserve at Adams Run. The right flank should be secured by a company of cavalry pushed well forward on Edisto Island, to give due notice of the advance of a column from that direction to turn our positions by crossing the Dawho at Pinebury, and field batteries ought to be able to prevent the passage of transports up the Dawho for the