The attack was commenced on the right by Lovell's division and extended gradually to the left, and by 1.30 o'clock the whole line of outer works was carried, several pieces of artillery being taken. The enemy made several ineffectual efforts to hold their ground, forming line of battle at advantageous points and resisting obstinately our advance to the second line of detached works.

I had been in hopes that one day's operations would end the contest and decide who should be the victors on this bloody fired, but a 10 miles' march over a parched country, on dusty roads, without water, getting into line of battle in forests with undergrowth, and the more than equal activity and determined courage displayed by the enemy, commanded by one of the ablest generals of the United States Army, who threw all possible obstacles in our way that an active mind could suggest, prolonged the battle until I saw, with regret, the sunk sink behind the horizon as the last shot of our sharpshooters followed the retreating fore into their innermost lines. One hour more of daylight and victory would have soothed our grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep on that lost but not dishonored field. The army slept on their arms within 600 yards of Corinth, victorious so far.

During the night three batteries were ordered to take position on the ridge overlooking the town from the west, just where the hills dip into the flat extending into the railroad depot, with instructions to open on the town at 4 a. m. Hebert, on the left, was ordered to mask part of his division on his left; to put Cabell's brigade en echelon on the left also, Cabell's brigade being detached from Maury's division for this purpose; to move Armstrong's cavalry brigade across the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and if possible to get some of his artillery in position across the road. In this order of battle he was directed to attack at daybreak with his whole force, swinging his left flank in toward Corinth and advance down the Purdy Ridge. Lowell-on the extreme right, with two of his brigades in line of battle and one in reserve, with Jackson's cavalry on the extreme right on College Hill, his left flank resting on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad-was ordered to await in this order or to feel his way along slowly with his sharpshooters until Hebert was heavily engaged with the enemy on the left. He was then to move rapidly to the assault and force his right inward across the low grounds southwest of town. The center, under Maury, was to move at the same time quickly to the front and directly at Corinth. Jackson was directed to burn the railroad bridge over the Tuscubmia during the night.

Daylight came and there was no attack on the left. A staff officer was sent to Hebert to inquire the cause. That officer could not be found. Another messenger was sent and a third; and about 7 o'clock General Hebert came to my headquarters and reported sick. General Price then put Brigadier-General Green in command of the left wing, and it was 8 o'clock before the proper dispositions for the attack at this point were made. In the mean time the troops of Maury's left became engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters and the battle was brought on and extended along the whole center and left wing, and I regretted to observe that my whole plan of attack was by this unfortunate delay disarranged. One brigade after another went gallantly into the action, and pushing forward through direct and cross fire over every obstacle, reached Corinth and planted their colors on the last stronghold of the enemy. A hand-to-hand contest was being enacted in the very yard of General Rosecrans' headquarters and in the streets of the town. The heavy guns were silenced and all seemed about to