SPECIAL ORDERS,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

No. 120.
May 2, 1863.

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II. Brigadier General R. O. Tyler, U. S. Volunteers, having reported at these headquarters for duty, is assigned to the command of the Artillery Reserve, and will enter upon his duties at once.

By command of Major-General Hooker:

S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 2, 1863.

Commanding Officer, Engineer Troops, in Camp:

You will make every preparation to be ready to lay the pontoon bridge, taken up from General Reynolds' crossing, to-night. Have it mounted on the wagons immediately, and be ready to lay it across the river within two hours of time you receive this order, in the vicinity of Falmouth; place will be indicated.

DANL. BUTTERFIELD,

Major-General, Chief of Staff.

CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 2, 1863-10.30 a.m.

Brigadier-General GRIFFIN,

Commanding First Division:

GENERAL: Major-General Couch's picket officer reports that the enemy is massing his troops in front of Hancock and toward the left. You are directed by the major-general commanding to be vigilant, and throw out pickets to keep a sharp lookout for any approach on the part of the enemy, and, whenever practicable for them to advance in any force, to throw out detachments, instructed to be careful not to allow themselves to be cut off, but at the same time to endeavor to ascertain if the enemy is in their front, and give timely warning of their approach.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRED. T. LOCKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 2, 1863-9.30 a.m.

Major-Generals HOWARD and SLOCUM:

I am directed by the major-general commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defenses worth naming have been thrown up, and three appears to be a scarcity of