and Colonel Miles' brigade to the left. The 300 cavalry under Captain Schwartz was placed on the plank road and a battery immediately in its rear, the rest of the division to follow closely as support, and the whole column right after this. When all was ready (and no time was lost unnecessarily in preparing), the advance was ordered. This was about 1 p. m., and notice was given to General Prince on my right.

We pushed on, and at the head of Mine Run, having driven the enemy 3 miles, we found him in his trenches. Colonel Miles' brigade especially acquitted itself in this movement. Time was necessary to bring up the three divisions in the rear to assault, and at the same instant staff officers from General Gregg reported that the enemy had cut his command in two, and called for re-enforcements. I at once sent word to General Terry to give General Gregg all the assistance he required, even to his whole division, but only one brigade, General Shaler's, was called for.

At this time Colonel Miles' brigade held the extreme left, and from the railroad around the right of the enemy. He was, however, nearly 2 miles distant from the main force. General Caldwell was holding from the railroad to the plank road, and had called for re-enforcements from General Webb, since the enemy were pushing skirmishers between himself and Price. General Webb's division had furnished one brigade to General Caldwell, and this brigade had taken up position on the right of the corps and had placed itself in the front. To take position in rear of Colonel Miles, I was then forced to take troops from the rear of the column to support him.

The dispositions thus forced upon me by the movements of the enemy in front and rear lost me some three-fourths of an hour or more, and prevented my taking advantage of daylight to assault the right or push forward my left, as I should have desired.

My troops came up rapidly and deployed, taking up positions which required time to reconnoiter, as the country was entirely unknown to us, and roads for the artillery between the Catharpin and plank roads had to be found, the woods, railroad, and streams all being obstacles to the movement. The enemy opened upon us with artillery, and moved his troops rapidly from his left to his right to protect the place we menaced.

We had passed Mine Run; it was no longer an obstacle, and there was no stream nor commanding ground between us and their base of supplies, but there was not time to advance farther. We lost during the movement 50 killed and wounded. As soon as it was dark, I reported in person to general headquarters. When I arrived there I found that a general assault had been planned for daybreak on the morrow, November 30.

General French had deemed an assault in his front impracticable. General Wright had deemed he could force the line and make a lodgment in our right, and when I saw him he reported the troops already in position. My personal report, as already indicated, made out the weakness of the enemy on our left. The general commanding, with the generous concurrence of my seniors, increased my command by two divisions of the Third Corps. I was to begin the assault at 8 a. m., and to be followed, a hour after, by an assault from our right. I spent all night in disposing my force to assault the enemy as he appeared before dark, and by daybreak I had finished.

The array was as follows: The front line was about 1 mile, and the troops were arranged in two and three lines, with strong supports