charge third in line of Putnam's brigade in the following order, in deployed column: First, Seventh New Hampshire; second, One hundredth New Yourk; third, Sixty-seventh Ohio; fourth, Sixty-second Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Steele; our brigade preceded by Strong's brigade. For some reason unknown to me our brigade was halted near the beacon-house, and Strong's brigae allowed to proceed on toward the fort. After remaining some twenty minutes we were ordered forward under a most galling fire. When about the fifth parallel our columns were very much sitrurbed by stragglers from Strong's brigade and the breaking of the One hundredth New York. It was here that we met the Third New Hampshire and Ninth Maine moving back by the flank. Upon arriving near the glacis the balance of Strong's brigade were lying down. Upon our brigade coming up they arose and the final assault was made. Of the number gained the fort from each regimentI am not able to say, but this I will state, that the only regiments that showed anything approaching an organization at this time were the Forty-eight New York, Sixth Connecticut, Seventh New Hampshire, Sixty-seventh and Sixty-second Ohio. A few men of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts (colored) and a few of the One hundredth New York were in the fort, but upon calling for the officers none reported to me do me from either of those regiments. I believe that in all there were not more than between 400 and 500 men in the fort from both brigades. Upon my reaching the parapet of the fort, seeing the confusion, I ordered the firing to cease. Called for Colonel Putnam. Getting no response, I called for Colonel Dandy. No respense from him. I immediately reconnoitered our position. Finding that we had driven them from the south bastion and a portion of the sea front, and finding the force so disorganized that it was impossible to make a farther advance into the fort, I immediately distributed the force at my command so as to hold what we had already gained. After making this disposition of the men I again renewed my calls for other field oficers, and at this time Colonel Putnam came upon the parapet. I learned from him that he had been outside the dithc, endeavoring to keep the men from going to the rear. I asked the colonel what he was going to do. He replied that he did not know what to do. Question: "Is Stevenson's brigade coming to our support?" He replied that he did not know. Question by him: "What do you think best? My reply was: "We cannot advance any farther with what force we have in its present disorganized state, and that I deemed it isufficient under any circumstances. That the best we could do was to hold our position until we got re-enforcements, and that with the help of another brigade we could take the fort or at least hold it until we got our dead and wounded off, adn that we had better send for re enforcements". Question by him: "Have you got a trusty lieutenant that you can send to the rear?" I replied that I had, and called Lieutenant Hathaway. No reply. I then called Lieutenant John c. Cochrane, who commanded Company K of the Sixty-seventh Ohio. Told him to go to the rear and say to the general that we held a portion of the fort, and if he would send Stevenson's brigade that we could take the fort, or at least hold it until our dead and wounded were taken from the field. This conversation took place between us on top of the parapet, both standing erect.

As Lieutenant Cochrane went out of the Fort I was watching to see him cross the ditch, which was enfiladed by the guns on the sea bastion, and while he was in the ditch Colonel Putnam turned to me and remarked,"Major, we had better get out of this," and fell dead with