contradicts General Stevens' allegations. Even if they had been true. I submit that, whether al commanding officer either approves or overrules the opinion of his subordinates in a council, it cannot be made a matter of charges against him afterward, or such council would probably never be called.

I amy add that the fact that General Stevens differed as to the hour only shows his concurrence in the main attack, which is further proved by his volunteered letter that I received June 7, in which he proposes the arrangements for a "dash" to seize James Island, below James River (including, of course, this battery), and hopes to see every man thrown in, and even named the time, "daylight," the hour that I eventually decided upon, and that he then opposed.

The orders of General Hunter directed me to provide a secure camp, in a particular position, limited and specified, in fact, by stating from what position it was to be protected by our gunboats. That position had not over about one-third of a mile squared of dry land not covered completely by the fire of the battery that we attacked, and I had about fourteen regiments and two large batteries to "provide a secure encampment" for.

To obey General Hunter's orders, therefore, that attack was indispensable, and as to whether that attack was well planned by myself and well executed by General Stevens, while I submit that it is a proper subject of investigation, as it may be in every case of non-success in this war, such investigation, I do not fear, will be other than triumphant for me.

I need not remark on what the result would be if, as in the present case, every commanding officer who directs a movement that has failed is to be stricken down by the very reports (and those unknown to him) of the actual subordinate whose disobedience of orders caused the failure.

H. W. BENHAM.

[Inclosure Numbers 9.]

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

Albany, N. Y., September 25, 1862.

General H. W. BENHAM, Portsmouth, N. H.:

MY DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 17th reached me only to-day. As regards the reconnaissance ordered for the 11th of June last on James Island, General Hunter will not dare deny that he knew of it, or that he delayed going to Hilton Head for twenty-four hours in order to learn the result of it. I returned from Hilton Head and Edisto on the afternoon of the 10th. A skirmish had been going on between Wright's forces and the enemy, but preparations were being actively made for the reconnaissance the next morning. Inquiries were made about signal rockets. The conversation was general in the saloon of the Delaware, and General Hunter was present and took part in it. You appealed to him regarding the rockets, and I told him and you that I had seen some on board the MattaNumbers General Hunter seemed to take as much interest in it as he did in any of the movements. Directly after this, he and you prepared his order to you, as he had determined to leave the next morning. After he had prepared it, he concluded, at your suggestion, to stay over the 11th and learn the result of the reconnaissance. There was some further talk about the work for the next morning, and we made preparations for an early start; but somewhat late came a note from General Wright, saying his men were too much exhausted to take part in the reconnaissance. This you communicated to General Hunter, and the reconnaissance was postponed.

The next day, on the afternoon of the 11th, I had a talk with General