he had commenced falling back. This was about 1 p. m. From my position at the batteries I perceived that the landing still rapidly progressed after Captain Chambers fell back and continued for several hours, so that Captain Chambers could not have seen the full number, as men were landed in large numbers after he left the position from which his estimate was made. I communicated constantly with Captain Chambers and Major Brevard, receiving information from the former and conveying to the latter the result of my observations and sending such directions as were considered necessary from time to time. Captain Chambers was compelled to fall back steadily before the enemy, and finding that his camp would soon fall into their hands, burned his tents and other property. He still kept me informed of his position and that of the enemy, and his couriers informed me that the enemy were bringing field artillery with them.

About this time a messenger came from Major Brevard, asking leave to proceed with his command in the direction of the enemy and contest his passage through the swamps, of which there were a few between them and the batteries. I perceived that this was our best chance to annoy the enemy with any effect and granted the leave asked. Before Major Brevard could over, however, intelligence was received from Captain Chambers that the enemy were now coming in two columns-one on the road as heretofore and the other much farther to the right. This second column had crossed Mount Pleasant Creek, and both columns moved apace with each other, guided by signal sounds. Major Brevard was now directed to remain in his present position. Shortly after this further intelligence came from Captain Chambers that the enemy had passed through his camp and were within a fe miles of the infantry, in rear of the batteries under Major Brevard. It was now growing late, and Captain Chambers was directed to fall back nearer to Major Brevard's position, as there was every indication that the enemy would make no halt, and it was desired to have his men in sufficient proximity to place them as circumstances should require when the enemy came up. I also sent out from the batteries a detachment of 45 men, leaving only four gun detachments at the bluff. Deeming it necessary to strengthen the infantry, Captain [W.] Stephens, with his won company and this detachment, was directed to take position considerable to the left of Major Brevard's line, as it was now tolerably certain that one of the columns of the enemy would follow the river as nearly as possible, in order that the advantage to them of their guns upon their shipping would be greater. The enemy now ceased their march.

I now perceived that with the greatly superior forces brought against us it would be impossible to successfully, or with any hoe of success, make a stand against them. Our forces in rear did not number more than 500 men, including the detachment sent from the batteries. this detachment was partially armed with the almost useless arms turned over by Captain Dickinson. Captain [W. H.] Milton was, in effect, unprovided with ammunition, and Captain Chambers reported the ammunition of his squadron damaged by the rain, which fell constantly during the day. This was not, therefore, an efficient force. I had only four gun detachments at the batteries. The enemy had, by report of Mr. Haynes (in every respect a reliable man), 3,000 men; also artillery. By the estimate of Captain Chamber they had 2,500 men in their main column (also artillery) at the time he was forced to fall back from Greenfield, and for four hours after Captain Chambers had fallen back from my position at the batteries I could distinctly perceive that rapid landing was still in progress. From the number of boats used and the