I cannot close this communication, major, without tendering you my thanks for the very efficient aid you rendered me during the entire night previous to leaving Corinth. I wish it was in my power to give a public acknowledgment to yourself, Colonel Smith (military governor, &c.), and Captain Lay for services rendered in saving the ammunition at Corinth.

Very respectfully, &c.,

R. B. HURT,

Military Superintendent of Railroads.

Major H. E. PEYTON,

Assistant Inspector-General.

No. 99 Report of Charles S. Williams, Assistant Superintendent of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, of the destruction of bridges, cars, &c.

CAMP AT SAWYER'S CUT, TENN., June 19, 1862.

DEAR SIR: The following report of the destruction of cars and engines on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, east of Cypress Bridge, on the morning of May 30, is respectfully submitted:

On May 28 and 29 requisition was made on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad by Major R. B. Hurt, military superintendent, for as many cars and engines as could be furnished; these were to be sent to Corinth, until the evening of the 29th, when, finding that the accumulation of engines and cars was so great as to prevent their being usefully employed, I ordered no more trains to be sent to Corinth.

The accumulation of sick at Corinth was so great that the mail train and a full train of box cars, designed for the transportation of the sick, were both detained, and did not leave until nearly night on the 29th.

During the day (29th) cars were ordered to different points near Corinth to be loaded-some to the breastworks east of the town, others around the Y to the Mobile and Ohio road, and actively employed in superintending the loading of the cars on that day, repeatedly told me not to allow a single empty car to leave Corinth.

Two trains that arrived on the day schedule on the 29th were ordered to the Mobile road, but owing to the track being occupied, they were not able to go around till nearly 8 o'clock at night, after which, having the main track clear for the first time, we commenced making up our trains. The manner in which the cars had been loaded, some being for the Mobile road and others for own road, rendered much switching necessary, and we were frequently blocked up at the Mobile crossing by trains standing across. It was therefore 12 o'clock at night before two trains were ready to leave.

About this time I was ordered to send immediately for the siege guns and carriages, which were at the defense east of the town. I did so, but the conductor returned with the intelligence that they were not yet loaded. A little past 2 o'clock on the morning of the 30th they were brought in. I received conflicting orders as to the destination of