front and on my right, where I had no support, I found the roads from Mechanicsville and Bethesda Church uniting in quite open country, and with topographical features such that if that junction were held by the enemy they would command the ground over which my attack was to be made. I was, therefore, obliged to give up my third line of battle to extend my line to hold this point. My line was formed thus: General Devens on the left, connecting with the Sixth Corps in two lines; General Brooks next on the right, in two lines, with half a line in reserve; General Martindale on the right, in battalions in column closed in mass, the masses being in echelon, with the right refused. The left divisions occupied a narrow strip of woods, the rebel lines being in another wood separated from us by cleared ground, varying in width from 1,200 yards to 300 yards. While my lines were being formed General Wright sent to ask me for re-enforcements, as the enemy was turning his left flank. Two regiments were sent to him from General Martindale's command, and shortly after a message was received from General Wright to the effect that it was exceedingly important for him to begin the attack, and I determined to move forward, leaving General Martindale to form his troops and hold the roads and our right flank. General Devens' front line then advanced, crossed the 1,200 yards of open ground under a murderous fire, entered the woods, the second line moving up to support the first. Pushing in through the woods they came upon another opening, in which was a rebel line of works too strong to attack, and so they held the line of woods. The leading brigade of General Brooks' division pushed through the clearing in their front, driving the enemy before them, until on reaching the second clearing they were met by so heavy a fire as to cause them to fall back within the woods. The leading brigade of General Devens' division lost heavily in officers and men; among others its gallant commander, Colonel Drake, One hundred and twelfth Regiment New York Volunteers, and when the fight was over was commanded by a major. The brigade of Colonel Barton (Devens' division) held gallantly what had been won until other troops could be thrown in to support them on the flank. The brigade of Colonel Guy V. Henry, Fortieth Massachusetts Volunteers, intrenched themselves in the woods they had gained. The advance of my lines, with the necessity of firmly holding the roads on my right, caused an extension of my front, which properly filled left me only one thin line of battle in General Martindale's front, a partial second line with General Brooks, and the same with General Devens. While arranging my troops for the night to hold what they had gained, my aide returned from headquarters and informed me that General Meade had said, in answer to my request for ammunition, "Why the hell didn't he wait for his supplies to come up before coming here?" My justification was the orders I had received from the lieutenant-general, and the fact that he knew my condition when I moved. During the posting of my troops the following letter was sent to headquarters:

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH CORPS, June 1, 1864.

Major-General MEADE,

Commanding Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: All the infantry ammunition I have is upon the persons of my men. Will you please make some arrangement to send me a supply immediately. At 11 o'clock this morning none of my supply train of wagons had arrived. I have