day and night. About 10 p.m. a false alarm was raised on the picket-line, when the Sixtieth Ohio, which was stationed immediately in our rear, opened fire upon us, which repulsed in the killed of 2 and wounding of 3 men.

On the 8th, at 3 a.m., the regiment was withdrawn from the front, and, after marching about 8 miles, was allowed to rest. On the 9th we broke camp at 4 a.m. and marched toward Spotsylvania Court-House. Early in the day, after forming several lines of battle, the regiment became warmly engaged with the enemy in front of the Gayle house. It was formed on the extreme left of the lines on a range of low hills running obliquely to the main road, and in a very exposed position. As the enemy advanced to the attack the Sixtieth Ohio Volunteers, which joined us on the right, gave way before the enemy's skirmishers, and thus allowed their advancing lines to occupy the higher grounds upon the right of the road, from which a very severe raking flank fire was poured upon my whole line. I immediately ordered a change of front by throwing the left forward, but the enemy continued to advance through the opening in our lines and to maintain a heavy flank fire on my right, which threw it into confusion, and by the mismanagement of the officers the whole right wing of the regiment began a rapid and disorderly retreat. The gallant and timely advance of the Seventeenth Michigan and the Seventy-ninth New York Infantry checked the enemy, and, after considerable exertion, I succeeded in rallying the disorganized companies, and advanced again to the position they had been driven from, which they held during the remainder of the day, securing ourselves from further disaster by erecting a temporary work of defense. Here allow me to remark that one great cause of the disorder and confusion of my regiment was the inaccurate firing of our artillery batteries. Most of their shells exploded over and in my lines, in several instances with fatal effect. This action of our batteries was inexcusable, as they were within plain sight and must have seen, if they had tried to see at all, that they were firing upon us. In the field orders of the succeeding day an implied censure was cast upon the regiment, which all felt to the unjust and the result of misapprehension. Few veteran regiments would have better withstood a charge by double their numbers in front, a heavy flank fire, and the active practice of both the enemy's and our own batteries, but even under these circumstances the men would not have flinched had they not been deceived by the acts and orders of one of the line officers, who gave the order to retreat without any authority for so doing. On the 11th, still holding its former position in the line, strengthening it with a strong line of breast-works. From its position it was all day exposed to a raking fire from the enemy's skirmishers, and from which the regiment suffered severely, until by extending and strengthening my skirmish line I succeeded in driving the rebels back out of range. During the night the lines were reformed preparatory to the desperate struggle of the succeeding day. On the 12th, by the sickness of Colonel Christ, the command of the brigade devolved upon me during most of the day. Nothing of importance occurred until after I was relieved, at my own request, and by the order of General Willcox, by Colonel Humphrey, of the Second Michigan Infantry, being very much depressed and exhausted by sickness and labor. I received verbal permission from General Willcox to leave the field, but soon after, learning that a charge was to be made, I