erals Crittenden and Potter, which resulted in considerable loss, it was concluded that it could not be carried by assault. Some ground, however, was gained which commanded parts of their line. This attack was well supported by the artillery, particularly by the batteries of General Willcox's division. That evening orders were received to move the corps before daybreak to the left of the new position which was to be occupied by the Sixth Corps. Signs of withdrawal by the enemy were discovered during the night, and our movement was accomplished without difficulty. The corps was marched on the south side of the Ny by the Beverly house, and took position on the left of the Sixth Corps, our extreme left resting near the Quesenberry house, within a mile of the Po River. Before dark our new line was well intrenched, On the 20th reconnaissances were sent out in the direction of Stanard's and Smith's Mills and the Po.

Our losses from the battle of the 12th till this movement was made were about 1,500 killed, wounded, and missing.

Soon after the battle of the 12th, the Provisional Brigade, under Colonel Marshall, was attached to the First Division, constituting the Third Brigade of that division.

The losses of the second epoch were as follows: First Division, 94 killed, 488 wounded, 21 missing; Second Division, 175 killed, 762 wounded, 256 missing; Third Division, 935 killed and wounded, and 313 missing.

THIRD EPOCH.

From May 20 to May 27. The march to the North Anna River and the operations at that place.

On the 21st directing were given to take up a new position, not materially different from our old one, and to hold it in connection with the Sixth Corps, until the movements of the Second and Fifth Corps uncovered the road in our rear, when we were to move down the road to Stanard's Mill, on the Po River, and effect a crossing there, if it could be done without too great opposition, and continue our march down the Telegraph road. The Sixth Corps was to follow us in this movement. Colonel Curtin's brigade, of General Potter's division, was started at once to seize the ford, and hold it, if possible, until the troops had passed. the enemy's pickets were encountered about a mile from the ford, and were quickly driven across the river, after which dispositions were made by General Potter to attempt to carry the ford by assault, it having been ascertained that the enemy were strongly intrenched on the opposite side of the river. The remainder of the command was put in motion upon the road to the ford. Just before sundown the enemy made an attack upon the Sixth Corps, General Wright, who was to bring up the rear, and on going back to his headquarters to ascertain if he needed assistance, it was determined to bring back General Willcox's division to his support, where it remained until after night-fall, when it followed the remainder of the command. Under the orders conducting this movement, it was not deemed advisable to attempt carrying the ford by assault, as it would have resulted in a very great loss even if it should be successful, so that the second route marked out in the instructions for the movement was taken. General Potter was instructed to retain on brigade to watch the ford until the entire Ninth and Sixth Corps had passed, when it was to bring up the rear