One engaged in that terrible conflict may well pause to reflect upon the horrors of that night. Officers and men lay down to rest amid the groans of the wounded and dying and the dead bodies of their comrades as they were brought to the rear. One thousand brave officers and men of the Vermont brigade fell on that bloody field. Was the result commensurate to the sacrifice? Whether it was or not the battle once commenced had to be fought. There was safety only in success. A retreat would have resulted in defeat, rout, and greater carnage. It is claimed, and it is believed admitted by division, corps, and army commanders, that the positive results of this engagement can hardly be overestimated. A glance at the situation will show this. The rebel army was advancing in two heavy columns; one down the old pike and the other down the plank road. These roads run nearly parallel, and at this point are about 2 miles distant. Our army was not yet in position. The Second Corps, which rested near Chancellorsville the previous night, was moving up circuitously from the left to this position. The fifth Corps was in position on the pike preparing for the attack; part of the Sixth Corps had been left to guard the approaches to our right and rear, and the remainder was in reserve or moving up to support the Fifth Corps. The Ninth Corps had not yet arrived. The rebel column on the plank road was moving down rapidly and was likely to gain the cross-roads before the Second Corps possible could. The three brigades of this division were sent to take and hold the position. Our arrival was opportune, as the rebel advance was then within a few yards of the crossing. The advance being repulsed, the enemy was evidently preparing for a vigorous attack. It is indeed claimed by some that the enemy was advancing to the attack at the same time we did, and it is instanced as one of the few remarkable occasions where two armies moved to attack at the same time. However this may be, there is but little doubt that the enemy was preparing for an attack, a portion of which must have fallen upon a part of the Second Corps before et was in position and while the rest of the corps was not in supporting distance. Our attack not only held the enemy in check, but put him upon the defensive while the Second Corps was moving into position. Had it been otherwise, the result cannot of course be stated. The Second Corps might have been able to sustain itself against any force hurled against it, but the enemy would have secured the important position and completely cut off that corps from the rest of the army.

May 6, the entire army attacked the enemy at daylight. This brigade advance on the plank road in two lines; two regiments upon the right and three upon the left of the plank road. The regiments were commanded as follows: Second Vermont, Lieutenant Colonel S. E. Pingree; Third Vermont, Colonel T. O. Seaver; Fourth Sixth Vermont, Major J. E. Pratt; Fifth Vermont, Major C. P. Dudley; Sixth Vermont, Lieutenant Colonel O. A. Hale. There were two lines of battle from the Second Corps in our front, and during the advance two lies from the Fifth Corps came from the right and filed in front of the others. At this time there was a general movement to the left, and the brigade all came together on the left of the road. The enemy had fallen back a short distance during the night, and when met was driven back nearly a mile farther. During this advance, there being two and some of the time four lines in front, this brigade suffered only from stray bullets and shells which came to the rear. Soon, however, the advance was checked, and the