the commencement of the present campaign till the 30th of June, A. D.1864.

On the march but a portion of the ambulances accompanied each division, the majority with the heavy portion of the trains being generally ordered either in rear of the corps or on some road that would not interfere with the marching of the troops. Pursuant to orders from army headquarters a portion of the hospital train was several times detached and sent to join the main of the corps, but after each battle the whole train was brought to the front. In all the battles in which the Fifth Army Corps has been engaged the principle in the management of the train has been the same - that is, the ambulances have been sent where they were most needed without reference to any particular division. If any of the divisions, as is frequently the case, suffered much more than the others the majority of the ambulances in the corps were used in transporting the wounded of that division to the hospital. The next day some other division might suffer most. In that way the work was in the end about equal.

At the commencement of a battle I have generally parked my whole train of ambulances at some central point under charge of an officer. I would then send a few ambulances as near as possible to the line of battle of each division. In that way but few ambulances would be exposed to fire at one time, and the stretcher men had but a short distance to carry the wounded. As fast as the ambulances in the front were loaded and sent to the hospital the officer in charge of the main park would send others to take their places, in this way placing the whole train at the disposal of the division most in need.

In the disposition of the officers, I placed one in charge of the main park, one or two to superintend the loading at each division, and the remainder to superintend the removal of the wounded from the field to the ambulances. It was also sometimes necessary to have an officer at the hospital to expedite the unloading and send the ambulances to the main park. By running the train in the manner above described, I am confident that the wounded were removed more rapidly than they could have been in any other way. Owing to the difficulty in procuring forage for the animals, and the severe work they were subjected to, some of the teams were much reduced, and a few of the animals lost, but not an army wagons was abandoned, and but four ambulances left on the road, having broken down and there being no time or means at hand to repair them. From the time we left Culpeper till after we crossed the Chickahominy not a particle of grain was drawn from the corps quartermaster for the ambulance trains. The train supplied itself when within reach of a depot, and when corn could be found in the country it was seized. In order to keep a train foraged properly it is necessary to keep two wagons in each division train for the purpose of hauling forage and not to be used for anything else, so that they are ready at any moment to start for grain. It also requires at least one to carry the quartermaster's property pertaining to a division ambulance train, and the personal effects of the ambulances officers, so that three instead of two, I would respectfully recommend, should be the number of wagons allowed a division ambulance train.

Every opportunity has been taken advantage of to obtain quartermaster supplies and animals for the train of