These troops I directed to be massed near the plank road in reserve. No further demonstrations were made in my front until 4.15 p. m., when the enemy advanced against my line in force, pressing forward until they came to the edge of the abatis, less than 100 paces from my first line, where they halted, and continued an uninterrupted fire of musketry. Thought the firing was very heavy, little execution was done among our troops, but after half an hour had passed, some of the troops began to waver, and finally a portion of Mott's division and Ward's brigade, of Birney's division, in the first line, gave way, retiring in disorder toward Chancellorsville. My staff and other officers made great exertions to rally these men, and many of them were returned to the line of battle, but a portion of them were returned to the line of battle, but a portion of them could not be collected until the action was over.

As soon as the break in our line occurred, the enemy pushed forward and some of them reached the breast-works and planted their flags thereon. A few of them were killed inside four breast-works. At the moment when the enemy reached our line, General Briney ordered Carroll's brigade, of Gibbon's division, to advance upon them back. Carroll moved by the left flank and then forward at the double-quick, retaking the breast-works at once and forcing the enemy to fall back and abandon the attack in great disorder, with heavy loss in killed and wounded. Brooke's brigade, of Barlow's division, was sent up from the left by General Gibbon to re-enforce Mott about the same time, but was just anticipated by Carroll's brigade, which reached the breast-works first and drove the enemy back. This attack was principally on the left of the plank road.

Dow's battery (Sixth Maine) rendered valuable and effective service, one section being on the plank road, the others in the second line near Mott's left. it delivered a destructive fire as the enemy approached our line, and was served with great steadiness and gallantry. The confusion and disorganization among a portion of the troops of Mott's and Birney's divisions on this occasion was greatly increased, if not organizated, by the front line of breast-works having taken fire a short time before the enemy made his attack, the flames having been communicated to it from the forest in front (the battle-ground of the morning), which had been burning for some hours. The breast-works on this portion of my line were constructed entirely of los, and at the critical moment of the enemy's advance were a mass of flames which it was impossible at that time to subdue, the fire extending for many hundred paces to the right and left. The intense heat and the smoke, which was driven by the wind directly into the faces of the men, prevented them on portions of the line from firing over the parapet, and at some points compelled them to abandon the line. About the time the enemy had been repulsed, I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding countermanding the order for the attack which had been previously directed to take place at 6 p. m.

While on my way to army headquarters between 7 and 8 p. m., in obedience to a summons from the major-general commanding, I was called upon for troops to assist Major-General Sedgwick, whose line had been broken by the enemy. I directed General Getty's division, Sixth Corps (then under command of General Wheaton), to report to General Sedgwick at once. The night of the 6th and the following day passed without material incident save that early in the morning of the 7th a reconnaissance was made under General