army was organized in the autumn and winter of 1861 and 1862, and the experience of many campaigns has proved its great value. Its records prove that on the field it has done its full share of the fighting and borne its due proportion of the losses of the artillery, while it has rendered other and fully as important services. At many of our principal battles, notably at Malvern Hill and Antietam, its ammunition trains supplies the batteries of the divisions, many of which would otherwise have been rendered useless. Whenever, from the character of the ground or from other circumstances, the ordinary amount of artillery attached to troops proved insufficient, it has supplied the deficiency. Its batteries in all our great battles have always gone into action at critical moments, and almost invariably every guns has been called for and employed. Especially was this the case at Malvern, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg. It has also been of great value in another way. Batteries in the corps losing their efficiency either from the want of men or material, the incompetency of their officers or casualties of battle, have been at once replaced from the Reserve, thus keeping the army corps fully effective and giving the broken-down batteries the necessary opportunity and supervision to restore them. In this way the Reserve Artillery has kept up the efficiency of the whole army. I have considered this notice of the Reserve Artillery as necessary under the circumstances in order to guard against the inferences which might be drawn from the order to break it up. The inconveniences that have since been felt from the want of it, the order to return the guns to the batteries, now being executed, and the fact that it has been found necessary to keep up the reality, without the proper organization of the Reserve, in order to insure supplies of ammunition to the army and to furnish a place for surplus unattached and disabled batteries, has clearly vindicated the principle of the necessity of such an organization in a large army. The mounted batteries of the Reserve Artillery were transferred to the corps, giving each of the three corps twelve batteries of four guns each. Major Hazard was assigned to the Second, Major Fitzhugh to the Fifth, Lieutenant-Colonel Monroe to the Sixth Corps.

To the Second Corps: Clark's (B), First New Jersey, four Napoleons; McKnight's, Twelfth New York, four 3-inch; Burton's, Eleventh New York, four 3-inch.

To the Fifth Corps: Bigelow's, Ninth Massachusetts, four Napoleons; Hart's, Fifteenth New York, four Napoleons; Sheldon's (B), First New York, four Parrotts; Barnes' (C), First New York, four 3-inch.

To the Sixth Corps: Brinckle's (E), Fifth United States, four Napoleons; Stevens', Fifth Maine, four Napoleons; Hexamor's (A), First New Jersey, four Parrotts; Ewing's (H), First Ohio, four 3-inch.

On the afternoon of May 19, near Spotsylvania, Court-House, an attack was made by Ewell's corps on Tyler's division of foot artillery. By direction of Major-General Meade, I ordered two batteries each of the Second and Sixth Corps to the point of attack and took the direction of the artillery in person, the batteries of the Fifth Corps being under the direction of Major Fitzhugh and those of the Second under Colonel Tidball. After a sharp action, in which the batteries rendered good service, the enemy was repulsed.

On the 28th of May, the Ninth Corps having been assigned to the Army of the Potomac, the nine batteries belonging to its divisions (the Reserve Artillery of the corps having been ordered to Belle