McCulloch had already started back to Panola, and requesting me time to do the same. It a once turned the head of my column, in that direction, an arrived at Panola about 2 o'clock the next morning. The train however, did not cross until about noon, owing to the darkness. Immediately on my arrival I sought Colonel McCulloch, and it was then agreed that the would meet the enemy that morning if he should appear, as was expected. We didrtainly his strength. Captain [Thomas] Henderson had sent out scouts about sundown on Wednesday evening to ascertain the movements and number of the enemy, and their Reports was hourly excepted, but was not then received. On the roads which, under the agreement between Colonel McCulloch and myself, fell to my lot to guard, I sent out scouts and pickets, but as the enemy did not appear on either road, nothing was seen of him by them. Information was received on Thursday which rendered it certain that the enemy had crossed had Wyatt in number superior to ours, though it force was not satisfactorily ascertained. It was agree upon another consultation on Thursday evening, that McCulloch should skirmish with the enemy on his approach, and I should take a position to support him, and that we would make a fight at Panola, if during the skirmish the enemy should not develop a force too great to be encountered. In the mean time we concluded to sens our the train south of Yockeney River, by River's Ferry. About 9 o'clock at night Henderson's scouts reported that the enemy, 2,200 strong, had crossed at Wyatt, and were then near Belmont, and that their previous failure to report was occasioned by their having been surrounded by the enemy. About time Colonel McCulloch's pickets were driven in, and some of the captured. About 12 o'clock Colonel McCulloch, who was unwell, sent for me to visit him. On my arrival, he stated that our information was the certain that the enemy greatly exceeded us in numbers, and that it was unnecessary to skirmish With to make him develop his strength, and that the had better withdraw our pickets as speedily as possible accorded exactly With my own views of that was right, and also With the views of Colonel [G. L.]Blythe and [John] McGuirk. It a nonce expressed my contest to it at prepared to carry it out. We accordingly left Panola about 2 o'clock Friday morning, and crossed the whole command over the Yockeney any 12 o'clock. It was our intention, if pressed on the rback on Grenada, the point at which the supposed the enemy was striking. Our united force did not exceed 800, and we were destitute of artillery. The enemy's force was three as times great, and we the knew they had two guns at least. We hooped, too, we might from a junction With General Chalmers at or near Mitchell's Cross-Roads. The road by Rider's Ferry could not be for retreat. I sent one company to the railroad bridge over Yockeney, which, I supposed, was sufficient to protect it against any small force sent to burn it. Our whole command would have been insufficient to protect to against all of their force. I May as well remark here that we had information of the crossing of Coldwater by that column which was afterward mat and dispersed by General Chalmers, and we did not known of the return of that column until it recrossed the Yockeney we concluded to move up to Yockeney Bridge With the double purpose of saving the bridge if we