the use of State money where necessary, and to send forward molasses, which can be advantageously exchanged, 1 gallon for 8 pounds of bacon, and which bring to our lines, even from beyond the enemy's a supply of bacon and which will bring to our lines,m even from beyond the enemy's a supply of bacon which neither force nor persuasion can otherwise obtain. Generals Johnston and Bragg rely chiefly for beef on the cavalry expeditions of General Pegram and Colonel Cluke into Kentucky, and on similar forays hereafter.

Generals Polk and Hardee also recommended that Messrs. Sam. Tate and Brinkley [?], of Memphis, should be employed to exchange cotton for bacon. General Johnston desires that some more vigorous efforts might be used to get the corn out of Northeastern Mississippi. Last June I engaged the accumulation of this corn in depots as soon as ready for market. Complaints have been made that the quartermasters are preventing its shipment by using the Mobile and Ohio Railroad for the purpose of speculation. General Johnston complained of the summary manner in which General Pemberton dismissed the complaint, without proper investigation.

Some propositions have been made by individuals in Mobile to take the Government vessels there, which it is said General Buckner does not think necessary for harbor defense, and run in meat. The terms of the proposition are before the Government. Government can certainly use and insure her own vessels as safely and cheaply as citizens can. If these vessels are not needed, they might be very usefully employed in running the blockade.

The communication of Major J. F. Cummings, purchasing commissary at large is filed herewith marked Exhibit H. It shows on hand, in reserve, 162,000 pounds dried beef, 247,500 pounds pickled beef, 5,267,855 pounds bacon and bulk pork, 600,000 pounds lard, 1,700 barrels of flour, and 3,000 beef-cattle. He discusses the modes of obtaining supplies. Whatever is resolved on in regard to subsistence must be done with promptness and decision. The question will not brook delay or indecision.

Your Excellency's attention is called to the present lines of our army. General Hardee's corps is at Tullahoma, with one brigade 12 miles to the right, at Manchester and with Liddell's brigade at Wartrace, 17 miles in front, and a brigade at Allisona, in the rear; General Polk's corps is at Shelbyville; Major-General Wheeler covers the right and front o the army, with his headquarters at McMinnville, and Major-General Van Dorn the left, in front of Columbia. Tullahoma is regarded as the central point, but the greater part of the army is to the left of it . It is not the intention or expectation of Generals Johnston and Bragg to await attack there, unless made in front, and this they do not expect. They believe that Rosecrans will attempt to pass our flank, most probably our right flank; in which case we would go out and attack him.

General Bragg seems to have been governed in his selection of Tullahoma as his chief point of defense by the convergence there of several roads. General Hardee preferred Decherd, as stronger and less easily turned, but Tullahoma having been determined on, under orders from General Bragg, marked out the line of the fortifications. I examined these fortifications, which are a line of slight redoubts extending in a semicircle from the Fayetteville to the Manchester road. Our advantage of ground is not very obvious, although the engineer in charge assured me it does exist, and the earthworks are low redoubts, not flanked by rifle-pits, except for some 20 yards or so. To my eye they seemed too far in advance of the crest of the hills. On the slope an abatis of heavy felled timber extends 1,500 feet to the front of each