of the way under fire of the enemy's skirmishers and artillery. Throughout the advance the regiment kept a remarkably good and steady line, and my greatest difficulty was to restrain the eagerness of the men to rush on.

The command was halted about dark, and lay in line until about 3 a.m. Sunday, 15th, when orders were received to return to the former position on the right of the line. Remained in old position on the right until 3 p.m. Sunday, 15th, when ordered to attack the enemy's left. The regiment moved forward under fire of artillery through an open field (meeting numerous stragglers from a line in front) in remarkable order. After advancing a quarter of a mile the regiment met the line in front in full retreat. This was within 100 paces of the enemy's position, and under heavy fire of small arms and the fire of a battery of artillery. The regiment did not falter, but moved forward through the retreating mass to within thirty paces of the enemy's position. The men were here exposed to a destructive fire. Seeing that the troops on the right had halted and were firing at long range, and being informed that those on the left were giving way, I went to the left of my command to see if this report was true. I soon discovered that it was. Seeing no superior officer, there being no hope of effecting anything by a farther advance nor by remaining where I was, I immediately gave orders to retreat in rear of the railroad, which was done. Arrived at the railroad, my men halted, but seeing that it was untenable, from the fact that it was nearly perpendicular across the line of the enemy's position, and seeing no organized support at hand, I ordered them to retire to their position in the line. In this charge I had 37 officers and men killed and wounded. That night the command retired across the Oostenaula, and subsequently fell back to New Hope Church, but offered battle near Adairsville and Cassville.

The command arrived at New Hope Church on the 25th day of May about noon, and was soon called into line of battle. The men threw up hasty works of old logs and fence rails. The enemy advanced about 4 p.m. and assaulted the position of General Clayton, whose right regiment was the next on my left. The enemy did not approach nearer immediately in my front than 150 paces, at which distance there was an eminence rather superior to the one on which my command was in line. This hill was densely covered with underbrush. Here the enemy halted and remained until dark, firing above my line, which I am satisfied they did not see. The fire of my command was held during the entire engagement in order to get a fair aim at short range. My men were very eager to fire at the enemy to the left and in front of General Clayton, from which direction I had 6 me wounded, but promptly obeyed the order not to fire. My men spent the night in improving their works as much as could be done with a few dull axes.

The 26th passed off quietly. I discovered early in the night of the 26th of May that the enemy were placing a battery in position in front of my left wing, of which fact I immediately informed Brigadier-General and Major-General Stewart, and proceeded to strengthen my works; but having only two picks and four shovels, much could not be done. The men, however, worked all night.

Early on the morning of the 27th of May the enemy's battery of 20-pounder Parrott guns opened a furious fire of solid shot, shell, grape, and canister, but fired too high. This was continued until 11 a.m. About 4 p.m. the fire was again commenced and with terrible effect.