be done. The comparatively large amount of cavalry in your command, as shown by your returns, the scarcity of forage which you had represented, and the evils resulting from the detached conditioin of that portion of Wheeler's cavalry with you, were also considered in determining upon the order. At the same time it was thought that you would have enough cavalry left to collect the forage in your department and prevent the enemy from making use of that and other supplies. Therefore it was hoped that if obliged to fall back you would take up a line as near Knoxville as possible, and one near Morristown and Bean's Station was suggested as being the nearest one to Knoxville which would put Cumberland Gap in your front. If your present line insures the safety and comfort of your command, and affords you the necessary supplies, it sufficiently answers your propose for the present. I agree with you in the opinion that it is not advisable under present circumstances to attempt the capture of Knoxville, for could it be taken with moderate loss what would be gained? Our great effort should now be for a forward movement as early as possible into Middle Tennessee, and, if circumstances permit, into Kentucky.

I have carefully considered your letter of the 22nd ultimo to the honorable Secretary of War in reference to mounting your entire force and moving it across the mountains into Kentucky.* I do not know how the horses could be obtained, and in view of all the difficulties attending such a movement-of which you are fully aware-and the doubtful policy of so far separating our forces, it seems to me best, at this distance from the field of opeations, that you and General Johnston should unite your forces near Maryville, and crossing the Tennessee River near Loudon with all the re-enforcements which can be sent you for the purpose, move toward Sparta, where, with your united forces, you will be between the enemy's divided forces at Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Nashville, and be in condition to strike either one of them, or move forward into Kentucky, as events may determine. At the same time a demonstration, perhaps a real move, could be made from North Mississippi into West Tennessee, and into Middle Tennessee if circumstances shoudl warrant. It is needless to point out to you the value of a successful movement into Tennessee and Kentucky, and the importance-I may say the necessity-of our taking the initiative. Every preparation should be made for whatever operation is to be undertkane without attracting attention, and when the movement is commenced it should be carried out with the greatest promptitude and energy. I will be glad to hear from you in relationto this matter, and to have the full expression of your views in relation thereto.+

Very respectfully and truly, yours,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

[32.]

MOBILE, March 8, 1864.

Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War:

SIR: Public sentiment here and in Mississppi, I regret to say, is much depressed, particularly in Mississippi, and many of our army, or that ought to be of the army in Mississippi, not only avoid service, but even threaten to resist the authority of our Government. In one word, public sentiment to a great extent is demoralized. To correct

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*See VOL. XXXII, Part II, p. 791.

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+For reply, see VOL. XXXII, Part III, p. 637.