cavalry vedettes and picket couriers and about 100 an infantry, the rest being required to attend to the horses and guns, of which there are six, viz, two 30-pounder Parrots and four 8-inch siege howitzers. I have two light batteries, numbering 200 men - 178 effective - with eight field guns. The men of these batteries have no muskets, and few could be spared for infantry duty. As far as practicable they are used for brigade and property guards. I have no cavalry. It will be perceived that, deducting the number required to man the guns, there are left 221 heavy artillerists, which, with the addition of the 100 men from the siege train, would give 320 men for all guard and picket duty and to act as infantry in any attack, and these are scattered with their several commands.

It is not necessary to say more. This simple statement of the force and situation is enough to exhibit the extreme hazard which we now run and our present danger, and to proclaim the necessity of re-enforcing, for upon the occupation of this island hangs the fate of Charleston. The enemy have a power of immediate concentration of all their troops in this department and of making a sudden attack. We have our batteries alone to rely upon to resist them, and they upon the water's edge with short notice of an approach. This island gained in force the anxious labor of years, and the bright flories of months of successful resistance have perished. New Orleans fell in 1862, Vicksburg in 1863. It is impossible to estimate the effect upon our cause. Charleston must not be permitted to fall in 1864; but earth-works and iron guns alone cannot defend her; men are required. I write this with extreme reluctance, but from a sense of duty. I will do all that can be done with the force left me.*

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. B. TALLIAFERRO,

Brigadier-General.

[35.]

COLUMBIA, S. C., May 10, 1864.

Captain FEILDEN,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

I have examined the country from Walhalla to Greenville, S. C., and submit the following report: + The limited amount of time at my disposal prevented me from visiting the country beyond the Blue Ridge. I, however, examined several of the passes over the ridge - the Rabun Gap for one, leading from Walhalla, S. C., to Clayton, Ga. This is perhaps the most practicable route by which the enemy could reach upper South Carolina. They might, however, reach Walhalla by the Cashe's Valley pike, or Greenville by the Ceaser's Head pike, Jones' pike, or Saluda Gap pike. Each of these pikes, as well as one or two others, are practicable for cavalry and artillery, and afford a ready entrance as well as an easy exist to a raiding force. The passes through the Blue Ridge - the several pikes - are of such a character that they can be easily defended by a small force, and should the enemy ever occupy the northwest counties of Georgia and the western counties of North Carolina in force this range would oppose a formidable barrier and good line of defense to keep the out of the State. Comparatively a small force could defend this line. There a few, if any, disloyal citizens in the northwest corner of South Carolina, but Rabun County, ga., and the

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*For probable answer, see VOL. XXXV, Part II, p.479.

+See Feilden to Black, April 28, VOL. XXXV, Part II, p.455.

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