a mass upon these lines at that point, Lee's and Hood's armies are separated forever, and the advantages of interior lines forever remain with us.

Third. Neither Charleston nor Savannah are necessary as bases for such a movement. The sea-coast islands between these points will suffice. The Edisto, Ashepoo, and Combahee (Port Royal) are all navigable for good-sized vessels nearly or quite to the Charlestown and Savannah Railroad, and our force can be thrown thus upon that railroad; then concentrate at Walterborough (say fifteen miles) and move upon Branchville (fifteen or twenty miles). With the Ashepoo navigable within five miles of Walterborough as a line of supply, with the Edisto on one flank (passable only by two or three bridges nearly up to Branchville), and the difficult and marshy line of the Combahee on the other, a force could operate with he greatest possible advantage. Branchville occupied and a small force landed in Bull's Bay (fifteen miles north of Charleston), Charleston itself would almost necessarily fall, or could be opened to our possession (then desirable) by the navy.

Fourth. The necessity of unloosening our clasp upon these vital lines of communication would compel both Lee and Hood to detach largely. Eventually the seat of war would be transferred to South Carolina. The movements could be made with great rapidity, would be comparatively unresisted, and can be effected when nothing decisive can be elsewhere accomplished. And I am strongly impressed with the belief that it must be made before the war ends, on sound military principles, and eventually of necessity.

Fifth. As a new draft will probably soon be made, could there be a better disposition made of 50,000 of these men than to send them to General Foster, with the above indicated plan in view, and where they cam be rapidly disciplined during inactivity elsewhere? In other words, cannot the best work be done here when other work must be put aside?

I trust you will pardon any seeming impertinence in writing this to you. The suggestions have met the thorough approval of so many capable officers, and have seemed so sound in principle that you will not accuse me of any other design, I trust, than to hit our enemy wherever we can do him essential damage.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. SEYMOUR,

Brigadier-General.

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,
November 12, 1864.

Brevet Major-General EMORY,

Commanding Nineteenth Corps:

GENERAL: The major-general commanding directs that you have your corps on the alert in the morning. General Powell just reports that he has driven Lomax's division two miles south of Front Royal, capturing all their artillery (two pieces), his caissons, ammunition train, and 150 prisoners.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. KINGSBURY, JR.,

Assistant Adjutant-General.