the railroad and establishing your supply depot at Martinsburg requires me to provide for that post and the protection of the railroad. To do this I ordered to Martinsburg Second Eastern Shore Maryland Infantry, 190, rank and file; Eighteenth Connecticut, 317; Thirteenth and Fifteenth Maine, 580; Eighty-fourth New York Infantry (100-days' men.), term of service expired; One hundred and ninety-fifth Pennsylvania Infantry (100-days' men), term of service expires on 20th, and Twelfth Maryland Infantry (100-days' men), term of service soon expires. Of this force, One hundred and ninety-fifth Pennsylvania and Twelfth Maryland are guarding road from Kearneysville to Hancock, leaving for fatigue duty, guarding depot and supplies at Martinsburg, about 1,350 men. This force, in my judgment, is not adequate to its responsibilities. When the term of service of the 100-days' en expires the railroad will be without guard. For garrison at the post I have solely Fifth New York Heavy Artillery, First and Third Battalions, nearly the whole of which I am compelled to use as guards for stores and details. The only remaining troops are Cole's cavalry and the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, which regiments, your chief of cavalry will inform you, are not strictly reliable. For the guarding fords of Potomac, hospital, and commissary stores at Pleasant Valley, railroad to Frederick, and garrison at that post, I have First Potomac Home Brigade Infantry, 189 men (a miserable regiment), with Spence's dismounted artillery, 150 men as infantry, and the Loudoun County Rangers, 100 strong; total, 400 men. This is my entire force; I think wholly insufficient. The Third Maryland Infantry and Seventh-fourth Pennsylvania Infantry were ordered to General Kelley by War Department, and no longer considered part of my force. In case of an attack upon this post I could not muster 1,000 trusty soldiers; these are inadequate to the routine duties daily incident to this post. As for cavalry, it was a farce to give me the Twelfth Pennsylvania and call it cavalry. They have only 336 men, ostensibly mounted, of which number not more than 200 can turn out mounted for the field. Of this number, 150 men sent two weeks ago in charge of one of your trains have failed to return. I understand Colonel Edwards, at Winchester, without authority, is detaining them at that post, so that I have really scarcely anything in the shape of cavalry.

Mosby has now concentrated his guerrillas in your rear and commenced operations, burning railroad trains and robbing passengers, which, without cavalry, I am powerless to prevent. He at the same time threatens all your supply trains. I understood you to say, when we conversed last upon the subject of this command, that in the event of your cutting loose you would give me sufficient force. I cannot consider my force sufficient either for defense if attacked in force, or for offense against the forces of the enemy in your rear. I desire to call your attention to the fact that the escorts for your trains to the rear are entirely too light. A train of 270 wagons came into Martinsburg last night with 100 cavalry and 230 infantry as an escort. If such escorts are relied upon, the result will be the loss of a train. Of this escort, a portion of the infantry are going home, leaving as a return escort about 260 men. To this I can add 325 remounted cavalry, and yet this escort is too small. When you reflect upon the fact that Martinsburg and a railroad line of fifty miles have been added to my responsibilities, and that you have taken from my force Currie's brigade and the War Department 800 infantry for General Kelley, leaving me without a single infantry regiment at Harper's Ferry, with no cavalry to scout the country, you will not accuse me of false clamor.