was made: Colonel Macauley ordered the One hundred and twenty-eighth New York to deploy as skirmishers. A strong working party was assembled in the rear ready to rush forward to strengthen the advanced position when taken; the One hundred and seventy-sixth New York (Third Brigade) in support of the working party, and the Twenty-second Iowa, of my own brigade, deployed and held in reserve in case the One hundred and twenty-eighth New York failed to carry the position. The attack was entirely successful. The rifle-pits taken were immediately strengthened to one continuous line, and the enemy showing some disposition to retake to repel any attack. The new line of battle consisted of regiments and parts of regiments of the Second and Third Brigades, the remainder being engaged as working parties and supports in the front. At 4.30 p. m. I received orders to open a fire of artillery and infantry to divert the enemy's attention; this was accordingly done. At 5 p. m. received orders to advance. I requested Colonel Macauley to take command of the right wing of the attack (while I more immediately attended to the left), and I would he then had under his command. We advanced under an annoying fire, with some loss, and occupied the new works, while the skirmishers advanced to the front. Upon the charge being ordered, the men advanced with great spirit, driving the enemy, who made but a weak resistance, from our front. The ground was very much broken, and, in consequence, although the troops advanced with great rapidity, I found the main position on the hill had been already taken by other troops, but to the right of those regiments which I led, the One hundred and seventy-sixth New York, of the Third Brigade, supported by the skirmishers from the Twenty-second Iowa, had captured four pieces of artillery. On arriving at the fortifications at the crest of the hill with the Eleventh Indiana and One hundred and thirty-first and One hundred and fifty-sixth New York in good order in line of battle, I received an order to push forward up the road, leading the head of the column. I threw the Eleventh-Indiana and One hundred and thirty-first New York on each side of the road as skirmishers, supported by the Third Massachusetts and Twenty-second Iowa as reserves, with a company of the Fourteenth New Hampshire (with fixed bayonets) some distance in advance on the road to prevent any dash of cavalry which might annoy the head of the column. In compliance with orders, the advance was made with as much rapidity as the darkness and the nature of the ground would permit. About 9.30 p. m. our skirmishers held their ground, and as soon as the confusion had ceased, advanced again. I sent word to the rear, particularly requesting that the troops in rear should be cautioned not to fire, but hardly had we advanced a mile when a brisk fire was again opened upon us from musketry and artillery in front, and again I sustained a fire from our own troops in the rear. The enemy was evidently prepared to meet us at this point; wire and other obstacles had been placed to delay the skirmish line, and two pieces of artillery were well trained upon the road. After a short delay the advance was again made and the enemy driven with but little opposition. The road was found strewn with the remains of burning wagons, and a large number of prisoners was captured by the command, and sent to the rear. At 3.30