son, who had the immediate command. The whole brigade, except the Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania, was exposed to an artillery fire, which caused what losses we suffered in the Second and Fifth Michigan and the Thirty-seventh New York.

On the 30th our general disposition was the same as on the 29th. In the forenoon the Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania reported to me. About the middle of the afternoon a change was made in our line, the Second Michigan keeping its old position, also the Thirty-seventh New York, but the Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania was put in line of battle facing the Leesburg road, and the Third Michigan held in reserve, ready to be thrown to any point where needed. The Fifth Michigan was deployed as skirmishers along the Leesburg road, their right connecting with the left of the Second Michigan. When it became evident that the forces on our left were giving way, the major-general commanding the division directed this brigade to fall back to the crest of the next ridge and form in line of battle facing the Leesburg road. This was done, our skirmishers as we retired exchanging shots with the enemy. When we had fairly gotten into position I looked to the left for General Robinson's brigade, which I understood was to form at the large brown house in that direction. I saw his troops apparently passing the house, which I have since learned was in obedience to orders from General Heintzelman. I at once ordered the brigade to the crest of the next ridge, 400 yards farther to the rear. Our right was still resting on Bull Run. At this time the enemy opened with one section of artillery upon our right and rear.

At the same time I found the ridge enfiladed by a battery to our left, which, however, was not firing at us, but the shots from which came right down the ridge. I ordered the brigade farther to the rear, keeping our right all the time upon Bull Run, until we crossed at dusk. At Locke's Ford, while we were crossing, the Second Michigan, which was still upon our flank as skirmishers, was attacked by the enemy's cavalry. The latter were driven back, with some half a dozen empty saddles. The officer commanding the cavalry fell, but whether killed or wounded I do not know.

The enemy at this time had two pieces of artillery at a distance of about 800 yards, with which they were trying to command the ford. If was behind this artillery that the cavalry rallied when repulsed by us. After crossing the ford I ordered line of battle to be formed upon the crest of a ridge among the corn. This was a tolerably strong position, and we would have been able to have held it for some time, but after two regiments had formed an officer, representing himself to be of General McDowell's staff, rode up and said that line of battle was being formed in the edge of the woods, and that General McDowell wanted us there. I moved to the edge of the woods, but found no line of battle nor indication of any. Everything seemed to be in confusion. Instead of there being staff or any officers directing matters, not stead of there being staff or any other officers directing matters, not one such was to be seen. It was now quite dark, and I deemed it best to move on to Centreville, and did so, arriving there at about 10.30 or 11 p.m. with all the regiments of the brigade.

I append a list of the killed, wounded, and missing.*

The men behaved well, being perfectly cool under the severe fire of artillery to which we were on several occasions subjected. Although not a witness of it myself, yet the long list of casualties in the Third Michigan testifies to the good conduct and hard fighting of that regiment. I would particularly mention Colonel Champlin, of the Third

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*Embodied in revised statement, p. 258.

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